Citizen participation in decision-making on complex and sensitive issues? Experiences with Xenotransplantation: report of the project "Impact of citizen participation on decision-making in a knowledge Intensive policy field" (CIT-PART) by Griessler, Erich et al.
www.ssoar.info
Citizen participation in decision-making on
complex and sensitive issues? Experiences with
Xenotransplantation: report of the project "Impact
of citizen participation on decision-making in a
knowledge Intensive policy field" (CIT-PART)
Griessler, Erich; Biegelbauer, Peter; Hansen, Janus; Loeber, Anne
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Griessler, E., Biegelbauer, P., Hansen, J., & Loeber, A. (2012). Citizen participation in decision-making on complex
and sensitive issues? Experiences with Xenotransplantation: report of the project "Impact of citizen participation on
decision-making in a knowledge Intensive policy field" (CIT-PART). (2. ed.). Wien: CIT-PART Consortium. https://nbn-
resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-347841
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
report of the project “impact of citizen participation on 
decision-making in a knowledge intensive policy field” 
(cit-part)
citizen participation
in decision-making on
complex and sensitive
issues?
experiences with 
xenotransplantation
citizen participation
in decision-making on
complex and sensitive
issues?
experiences with 
xenotransplantation
report of the project “impact of citizen participation on 
decision-making in a knowledge intensive policy field” 
(cit-part)
5 4 
contents
executive summary   7 
chapter 1   introduction   17
chapter 2   technology assessment and participation   21
chapter 3   what is xenotransplantation and why does  it pose a problem 
 for policy making?   25
chapter 4   to what extent was participatory technology assessment 
 applied in decision-making on xenotransplantation?   29
chapter 5   impact   49
chapter 6   how democratic were the regulatory processes?   73
chapter 7 political practices   93
conclusions   113
annex   129
contents
A synthesis report written by Erich Griessler, Peter Biegelbauer, Janus Hansen, Anne Loeber
Based on studies conducted by Erich Griessler, Peter Biegelbauer, Alexander Lang, Ingrid 
Metzler, Anna Pichelstorfer, Karina Weitzer (Institute for Advanced Studies); Edna Einsiedel, 
Mavis Jones, Meaghan Brierley (University of Calgary); Janus Hansen (Copenhagen Business 
School); Aivita Putnina and Jekatarina Kaleja (University of Latvia); Anne Loeber and Wytkse 
Versteeg (University of Amsterdam), Susanne Lundin and Kristofer Hansson (University of 
Lund); Nik Brown and Sian Beynon-Jones (University of York)
The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission
For more infomation see www.cit-part.at
6 
executive summary
executive summary 7 
9 8 executive summary executive summary
2. Case studies. In-depth case studies of xenotransplantation policies, as well 
as the use of TA and PTA therein, of selected countries and international 
organisations.
3. Comparative Analysis.
In addition to wide-ranging analysis of literature and policy-documents, 135 in-
depth interviews were carried out at the national and international level with 
policy-makers, experts, stakeholders and representatives of NGOs involved in TA 
and PTA.
New knowledge and/or European added value
CIT-PART provides an overview of the use and impact of expert advice and 
formal citizen participation (PTA) in xenotransplantation policies in the selected 
countries and organizations. Moreover, it provides examples of good practices 
of PTA and factors, which facilitated and constrained its use in science and 
technology policy.
Key messages for policy-makers, businesses, trade unions 
and civil society actors
One of the most important issues highlighted by CIT-PART is that citizen 
participation, in terms of PTA, was rarely used in xenotransplantation policy-
making. Civil servants and experts were the actors most heavily involved in 
policy development. They framed xenotransplantation primarily as a technical 
and scientific problem. The public, on the other hand, was only actively involved 
to a small degree. Although the three cases of PTA (CA, CH, and NL) did not have 
a direct impact on decision-making in the strictest sense, they did affect the way 
that the topic was discussed and handled.
In the future, PTA should be strengthened, particularly in expert advisory bodies 
at the international level, since these are also pivotal for national policy-making. 
Narrow scientific framing as well as decision-making by closed and impermeable 
groups formed out of civil service personnel and experts are major obstacles for PTA.
Objective of the research
CIT-PART comparatively studied the use and impact of participatory technology 
assessment (PTA) and expert based technology assessment (TA) in science and 
technology policy in several EU Member States and organizations such as Austria 
(AT), Denmark (DK), Great Britain (GB), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), The Netherlands (NL), 
Sweden (SE), the European Commission (EC), the OECD, Canada (CA), Switzerland 
(CH) and The Holy See (VA). From that CIT-PART drew conclusions about the use 
and potential impact of institutionalised citizen participation at the EU level.
In contrast to existing comparative studies on PTA, CIT-PART compared the use 
and impact of TA and PTA in the context of the same technology.
The main questions were:
• To what extent was TA and PTA used?
• Which factors facilitated and constrained PTA?
• What was the impact of TA and PTA on policy-making?
• How can PTA increase citizen participation on decision-making?
CIT-PART studied these questions by taking xenotransplantation policies 
in the 1990s and early 2000s as an example. Xenotransplantation involves 
the transplantation of cells, tissues and organs from animals to humans. It is 
representative of many contemporary technologies in the sense that it is a complex 
problem, possibly with huge potential benefits, on the one hand, but also risks and 
ethical challenges on the other. It is therefore potentially controversial in public.
Scientific approach/methodology
CIT-PART included three phases:
1. Mapping the field including (a) analysis of democracy theory in order to obtain 
models and instruments of democratic participation, (b) overview on policies 
on xenotransplantation and the procedures upon which they were based as 
well as on public attitudes towards xenotransplantation, (c) classification of 
xenotransplantation policies.
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• In two countries there was no debate at all (AT, LV).
• In most cases xenotransplantation did not give rise to serious conflicts and was 
handled as “business as usual” (DK, EC, IT, OECD, SE, VA).
• In two countries a situation of managed tension arose (NL, CH).
• However, in Canada and Great Britain, xenotransplantation was discussed in 
the context of a serious crisis of trust in government regulation.
Second, framing of xenotransplantation as a topic was contingent on and varied 
between cases.
• In most countries the topics of organ shortage and risk dominated the discussion.
• In some cases xenotransplantation was discussed in the context of national 
economic competitiveness (CH, EC, GB, LV, OECD, and SE).
• Less frequently ethical issues (CA, CH, SE, and VA) and animal welfare (CH, EC, 
NL, and VA) were critical and they became significant topics only in a few cases.
• In two cases trust in government (CA, GB) became critical.
• In one country xenotransplantation gave rise to struggles for competencies 
between parliament and government (NL).
Weak role of the public
The public was mostly involved in the weakest possible form, i.e. through surveys 
(in all cases except CH, LV, OECD, and VA). Additionally, with the exception of 
Austria, almost all countries informed the public in one way or another. This was 
done to varying degrees, ranging from full-blown information campaigns (CA, CH, 
NL, SE) to simply publishing reports online (EC, DK, IT, OECD, VA). In a few cases 
the public was consulted. The intensity of consultation varied and was found to 
be very strong in some cases (CA, CH, GB, SE), strong in others (SE), or rather weak 
(EC, OECD). Again, the public was only involved in PTA exercises in CA, CH and NL.
Little direct but broader impact of PTA
Although policy-makers approved   in all the cases in which PTA was carried out 
of both the PTA itself and its results, no unambiguous direct impact of these 
exercises could be established.
Key findings
Diversity of policies
In the early 2000s, a diversity of xenotransplantation policies existed across 
Europe. They ranged from a wait and see position, in which no particular policies 
were formulated (AT), to permissive ones, which allowed clinical trials following 
approval by responsible authorities (EC, IT, LV, OECD, CH, GB, VA), to formal and 
informal moratoria on clinical trials (CA, DK, NL, SE).
Expert advice dominates
Expert TA dominated policy advice on xenotransplantation policies. Only a small 
minority of governments commissioned PTA to involve the public (CA, CH, NL). In 
some cases, academics initiated participatory exercises (AT, EC, and GB). These 
had no direct impact on decision-making in xenotransplantation policies.
Experts and civil servants are critical actors
In almost all of our cases, civil servants and experts were “the” critical actors 
in policy development. Elected politicians only contributed to policy making 
in a few countries (CA, CH, DK, NL, SE). Despite the fact that reports repeatedly 
mentioned ethical issues as critical, ethicists – either in the form of national 
ethics committees or single experts involved in TA and PTA – played a lesser role 
and only became strongly involved in a few cases (CA, SE, UK and VA). NGOs also 
became involved in only a few countries (GB, CA, CH and NL). Particularly animal 
welfare organisations faced difficulties to participate. In some cases, there was 
almost no public involvement beyond information being made public (AT, IT, LV, 
VA, OECD). By contrast, industry and science were able to considerably contribute 
as stakeholders to policy development. Citizens only became actively involved in 
xenotransplantation policies in a minority of countries (CA, CH and NL).
Diversity of framing, but organ shortage and risk often dominate
First, xenotransplantation was not a controversial topic or the subject of hot 
debate in all cases.
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• The kind of institution in which an advisory body is located;
• Its mandate as advisory or regulatory body;
• The extent to which its connection to policy-making was institutionalised, and
• Its reputation as a competent and independent organisation.
• Moreover, the technical development of the policy issue and its framing in 
political and broader public debate played a role.
Factors facilitating PTA
• Existing traditions that PTA can build on, i.e. commissions involving participatory 
elements, adult education, direct democracy, consultation;
• Existing practices of accountability and openness;
• Coordination with responsible policy-making authorities and departments;
• Combinations of various methods (e.g., surveys, emails, plays, consensus 
conferences);
• Involvement of the wider social and political context in the organisation of PTA 
and dissemination of its results;
• Involvement of antagonistic groups in the PTA.
Factors constraining PTA
• When a topic is not perceived as political at all because it is only framed as a 
scientific issue  excluding questions of collective risk, ethics, human rights, politics 
and economics   or is considered as a matter of individual choice only;
• Case-by-case decision-making on individual clinical trials, which undermine an 
understanding of xenotransplantation as a fundamentally political issue;
• When the public does not consider itself to be a legitimate actor vis-à-vis 
policy-makers and experts;
• Traditions of paternalism, neo-corporatism and a strong and exclusive links 
between elites from science and the civil service that exclude the public;
• Lack of infrastructure and funding.
• In the Netherlands, the results of the PTA were available only after 
xenotransplantation policies were adopted and the organizers of the PTA did 
not have concrete plans for feeding them into policy-making. As it turned out, 
PTA results and official xenotransplantation policies were congruent.
• The same was true for Switzerland, where there was again an agreement 
between PTA results and government policies, which were determined before 
the end of the participatory exercise.
• In the Canadian case, it was hard to pinpoint a direct impact of the consultation 
exercise because the government did not make an official statement on its 
xenotransplantation policies and, in accordance with the public consultations’ 
opinion; thereafter no clinical trials were carried out.
However, adopting a perspective on impact assessment that goes beyond 
the mere handing over of a final report, all three PTAs had an impact on the 
development of xenotransplantation regulation. The PTAs contributed to creating 
public awareness of the issue and to a (re)configuration of the relationship 
between relevant actor groups. PTAs also played a part in the definition of 
xenotransplantation as an issue by legitimizing and giving authority to claims 
made by actors and regulatory procedures. In all three cases, PTA exercises were 
by and large considered legitimate and meaningful ways to gain knowledge and 
to involve the public in a debate about science and technology policy.
Varied impact of TA as well
Difficulties in the integration of findings from assessment studies into policy-
making are not restricted to PTA. Expert TA also faced difficulties in directly 
impacting the regulation process. While in three of our cases, expert TA exercises 
had a strong impact on policy-making (DK, GB, and OECD); in another two cases 
direct impact was weaker or at best ‘mixed’ (EC, VA). However, in three cases there 
was no direct impact on policy-making at all (IT, LV, SE). Important factors that co-
determined a study’s impact were: 
executive summary executive summary
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PTA should be embedded in institutions to allow for learning
Institutional learning should be embedded in such organisational practices. 
Most topics in science and technology policy present issues that cut across 
institutional borders. Specialisation in departments, however, might reinforce 
departmental fragmentation and struggles. PTA, as social innovation, must work 
against organisational fragmentation by involving all responsible authorities, 
agencies and departments in order to increase the impact of PTA later on.
Existing participatory traditions and practices should be built on
In a number of cases, case studies revealed existing participatory traditions and 
practices (commissions, adult education, direct democracy, consultation, practices 
of accountability). PTA can build on and learn from these existing traditions.
International examples to identify and overcome factors constraining 
PTA can provide valuable lessons
Closeness of policy-making, closely knit policy communities, paternalism, expert 
orientation, and lack of accountability, transparency and openness, lack of open 
public debate and of an active mass media might represent severe obstacles 
for PTA. However, there are a number of international examples that worked to 
overcome these obstacles. It is possible to learn from and even to improve on 
these existing examples. Solutions to overcoming obstacles were also found 
to exist in TA; these were related to critical components such as transparency, 
openness, accountability, embedding, diversity of methods, involvement of 
antagonistic groups, overcoming the division between the different cultures of 
science, opening of framing, improving timing, and enhancing direct impact.
Impact should be planned
Direct impact on policy-making and impact on the public debate in a broader 
sense has to be planned and actively attended to.
Recommendations
Use of PTA should be increased
PTA was only carried out to regulate xenotransplantation in a minority of cases 
and had little direct impact on regulation. However, when assessed in terms of 
the process-oriented impact assessment framework developed in the CIT-PART 
project, PTA can be considered a success, given its numerous positive effects in 
creating and stimulating public debate.
The use of PTA should therefore be increased at the national level in general but in 
international expert bodies and at the EU level in particular, where discussions of 
technologies tend to be purely framed in terms of “sound science”. This poses new 
challenges for international organizations of ensuring a broader framing of issues.
Citizen involvement should be at the heart of framing
Expert bodies are advised to increase awareness of how their work may impact 
on the way that an issue is framed in national and international policy-making 
processes. In addition to the many mechanisms that increase accountability, the 
encouragement to include citizens in processes of analysis, judgement and even 
decision-making should be more than just an appendix to the recommendations. 
Only if the idea of civic engagement is at the heart of a body’s framing of the 
issue may it further help public involvement on a countrywide level.
Broad framing should be allowed for
Expert advice should allow for a broad framing that not only considers “sound 
science” but also allows for social, political, economic and ethical questions to 
be raised by stakeholders and the public.
PTA needs an addressee in policy-making
PTAs should be integrated into organisational practices of formal policy bodies 
to ensure that they can have an impact and that their outcome is acknowledged 
in decision-making arenas.
executive summary executive summary
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Allow for time
Several cases showed that regulators felt a certain urgency to arrive at policies, 
which was produced by promises by xenotransplantation researchers that 
clinical trials were imminent. However, predictions that clinical application was 
‘just around the corner’ turned out to be unrealistic. Participatory experiments 
need time. Policy-makers should therefore consider not responding to pressures 
produced by promises from science and industry too promptly. Policy-makers 
should instead allow sufficient time to stimulate proper civic engagement in 
procedures for political judgement on issues such as xenotransplantation, which 
touch on the very basics of our understanding of public health, medical choice, 
collective safety and human identity.
chapter 1
introduction
chapter 1 17 executive summary
19 18 chapter 1chapter 1
• How can PTA increase citizens’ influence on decision making? What are ways 
to improve the impact of citizen participation on policy-making on national 
and EU levels? Did citizen involvement increase the democratic legitimacy of 
policy decisions?
CIT-PART addressed these questions through analysing the reactions of various 
political systems to the challenge of xenotransplantation.
Xenotransplantation stands for the transplantation of animal organs, tissues 
or cells into humans. Xenotransplantation is highly controversial: Its advocates 
perceive it as a promising technology since it could address the shortage of human 
transplants, but its opponents insist that it involves many risks, most prominently 
infection from animals to humans, as well as ethical questions about appropriate 
human-animal relations and economic priorities in the health care sector.
The CIT-PART project assumes that the impact of citizen participation on 
decision-making is not only dependent on the quality of the PTA process itself 
but on practices of policy-making in which PTA is embedded. Following from 
this theoretical approach the project applied qualitative methods of empirical 
research such as in-depth interviews and document analysis.
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Citizens, policy makers and social scientists often call for citizen participation to 
make policies simultaneously more effective and democratic. This claim has been 
made vigorously in science and technology policy, as shown by new biotechnologies 
and nuclear energy for example.
During the past two decades, many countries have therefore witnessed the 
introduction of Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA) exercises in science 
and technology policy. In contrast to expert based Technology Assessment (TA), 
PTAs are procedures where lay citizens systematically discuss the pro- and contra-
arguments of certain technologies. While most people would probably agree 
that such forums of debate have inherent democratic merits and a democratizing 
potential, important questions remain about their actual impacts on policy-
making. Impact could be PTA’s Achilles heel for reaping the democratizing 
potentials of enhanced citizen participation.
The CIT-PART project studied the use and impact of PTA and expert based TA 
comparatively in several EU Member States (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom), the European Commission, the OECD, 
Canada, Switzerland and The Holy See (in this report designatied with the more 
commonly used name the Vatican), and addressed the following research questions:
• To what extent and in what context were citizen participation exercises applied 
in the case of xenotransplantation across Europe?
• What were the factors that facilitated or limited citizen participation in complex 
decision-making processes? And to what extent did cultural differences 
account for variation across countries in this respect?
• What in actual fact was the impact of PTA as one approach to promote citizen 
involvement on decision-making processes? In which way were PTA processes 
more or less effective with regard to their impact on decision-making compared 
with expert based TA?
• What can we learn about the complex relation between lay-peoples’ and 
experts’ views and expertise in TA and PTA?
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Outline of this brochure
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the topic of technology assessment 
(TA) and participatory technology assessment (PTA). Chapter 3 briefly explains 
xenotransplantation and why we considered it an appropriate example through 
which to study TA and PTA exercises comparatively. Chapter 4 compares 
xenotransplantation policies and expert as well as citizen involvement. Chapter 
5 addresses the question of how to assess the impact of the PTA and TA exercises 
studied. Chapter 6 puts PTA in the context of different strands of democratic 
theory, and applies a categorisation developed from there on the cases of 
xenotransplantation policy-making. Chapter 7 provides an overview on political 
practises applied TA and PTA. The final chapter comprises a summary of the main 
outcomes and the conclusions drawn from the CIT-PART project.
chapter 2
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• The insights into the socially constructed nature of technology also inspired 
and enforced a less analytical, more political criticism. The assumed 
objectiveness of the expert’s view was demystified in the context of the rise 
of social movements in the 1970s, such as: the anti-nuclear movement, the 
environmental movement, and the second wave of feminism as, so to speak, 
a bias-in-disguise. ‘Objective’ expert knowledge was exposed for carrying the 
mark of the money on its production.
This type of criticism led to a call for a ‘democratisation’ of knowledge and 
the ways in which it was applied in the production of artefacts and decisions 
(Liberatore/Funtowicz 2003). Among the developments this set forth were 
attempts at a broadening of the basis for decision-making on science and 
technology. This ambition was at the heart of the methodological innovation in 
TA to include citizens, laypeople and – later on – patients in assessment schemes. 
Advocates of PTA typically invoke these lines of argument.
On the one hand, PTA has the advantage of taking into account the knowledge 
and values of laypeople that are normally factored out of experts’ discussions. 
These concern the definition of problems and issues to be investigated, the 
inclusion of local knowledge, the identification of chances and risks involved in a 
given technology, and the elaboration of innovative solutions. Thus, participation 
is claimed to increase the analytical depth of TA.
On the other hand, the inclusion of affected persons may also improve acceptance 
of decisions on technology policy (Commission of the European Communities 
2001) and help to create arenas where negotiations over competing demands and 
an elaboration of solutions can take place. PTA procedures are arrangements where 
not only knowledge, but also legitimacy and trust can be created.
Thus, PTAs are arrangements by which “experts and laypersons, decision makers 
and affected persons, opponents and advocates, all together try to reach a 
reasoned decision on whether or not a controversial new technology should be 
introduced, and if so, how it would have to be regulated” (Bora/van den Daele 
1997). Many authors perceive PTA – as with TA as a tool for policy advice, but some 
see its scope as wider, embracing “decision-making” too (Joss/Durant 1995: 290).
Before taking a closer look at the findings of CIT-PART, let us first consider 
the two issues that are at the heart of this project: Technology Assessment 
(TA) and Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA) on the one hand, and 
xenotransplantation on the other. Let us first address (P)TA: what is it and why it 
is it worth organising?
Since the 1970s, controversies about the physical risks and social impacts of 
science and technology have given rise to TA in many countries (Van Eijndhoven/
Van Est 2002; Bröchler et al. 1999). TA as a scientific counselling tool aims 
at broadening the knowledge base of political decision making through 
comprehensive analysis of socio economic conditions and of possible social, 
economic and ecological consequences of new technologies. The underlying 
rationale is that scientific expertise may improve political decisions. Its 
proponents initially saw TA as an opportunity to add rationality to policy-making 
by “speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979).
Proceeding from this assumption, the US Office of Technology Assessment’s 
method inspired by the ideal of objective, unbiased, scientific counselling on policy 
advice was exemplary for many other TA organisations (Grunwald 1999: 174). 
Over time, this expert oriented approach drew criticism on both normative and 
pragmatic grounds (Hansen 2010; Joss/Torgersen 2002: 157):
• Insights into the limited scope of technocratic TA approaches to offer solutions 
were sobering; so were the findings on the actual impact of TA studies, which 
did not reach the high levels of expectation placed on them.
• In general, doubts arose more about the assumption implicit in TA that firm 
scientific knowledge about future developments is obtainable, and that 
authoritative advice on policy decisions can be given.
• The conviction that technological innovation could solve the problems of 
industrial society was challenged.
• Research carried out in the field of the ‘social studies of science’ showed that 
technology is socially constructed and hence can be influenced at the stage of 
construction; this inspired all sorts of new varieties of TA aimed at influencing 
technologists and scientists rather than policy-makers.
chapter 2 chapter 2
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The past fifteen to twenty years have witnessed the development of a wide 
variety of methods and participatory designs. After years of experimenting with 
PTAs, the assessment of their impact is now considered a key concern of PTA 
research (Abels 2007; Loeber et al. 2011).
The CIT-PART project addressed the question of use and impact of TA and PTA 
from an internationally comparative perspective, focusing on a highly sensitive 
policy issue. To allow for a comparison of how policy on such an issue is advised 
and informed, a salient issue was selected that provoked to various degrees 
decision-making in all countries selected: xenotransplantation.
chapter 3
what is xenotrans-
plantation and why
does it pose a problem
for policy making?
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• What are the potential effects of a large-scale implementation of 
xenotransplantation on public healthcare spending? Is this acceptable, given 
national and international inequality?
We selected xenotransplantation as a vehicle for studying how and why 
decision-making on such a salient topic is advised and informed, and the effects 
of including citizens in such an analytic process, for several reasons:
• Firstly, as mentioned above, xenotransplantation research involves – as many 
contested modern innovations in science and technology do – questions of 
risk, uncertainty and ethics.
• Secondly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s many national governments and 
international organisations had to formulate within a relatively short period 
of time policies concerning the medical risks and ethical questions posed 
by xenotransplantation research. Policy makers in different countries and 
international organisations had to deal with the scientific, social and ethical 
questions posed by xenotransplantation.
• Thirdly, policy-makers addressed these questions differently with regards to 
process, as well as content. To support their policies some governments solely 
involved experts, some also included stakeholders, some tried to represent the 
interests of the public by including elected politicians, whilst others also asked 
ordinary citizens. In addition different governments took different policies 
towards xenotransplantation.
In order to learn from this diversity, as said, we developed a comparative research 
design including countries in Europe and North America as well as some of the 
most important international organisations operating in this field.
Thus, in contrast to most impact studies, which centre on the concept of PTA, the 
CIT-PART project took as a point of departure an ethically sensitive and technically 
complex technological issue, rather than participatory experimentation per 
se. Putting the emphasis on substance rather than on procedure as a common 
Xenotransplantation is the transplantation of cells, tissues, or organs from one 
species to another (Council of Europe 2003). It is a medical intervention, the 
scientific basis and practical application of which are the subject of on-going 
worldwide research. As with many technological and scientific advances in 
medicine, xenotransplantation holds the promise to cure diseases, but it also 
entails risks and ethical problems (Engels 2002; Schicktanz 2002; Sykes et al. 2003).
Xenotransplantation was presented by its advocates as a solution to reduce the 
shortage of implantable organs, cells and tissues observed in many countries 
(OECD 1999). Therefore it would, if made available, contribute to saving lives. For 
that to happen, numerous immunological and physiological obstacles have to 
be tackled (Beckmann et al. 2000). Among these obstacles is the risk that known 
or unknown viruses from the so called “source animals” could infect the human 
recipient and possibly spread to the population at large, thus causing, in the 
worst case, epidemics of yet unknown diseases (e.g. Butler 1998).
Some of the basic ethical questions connected with xenotransplantation 
discussed worldwide include:
• Taking into account religious beliefs and/or ethical convictions; is it acceptable 
to use animals as “sources” of organs, cells, or tissues for human beings?
• Under which conditions is it permissible?
• Would it be tolerable to limit the individual freedom of patients and of their 
relatives in order to control the risk of infection, e.g. by quarantine, life-long 
monitoring?
• By whom and in what way could informed consent be given for xenotransplantation?
• What role do arguments based on animal ethics play with respect to the 
required genetic modification, cloning, breeding and keeping of “source 
animals”?
• Does xenotransplantation imply a “transgression” over the barrier between 
species and how is this to be evaluated? What effect would xenotransplantation 
have on the patients’ identities (e.g. Hansson 2011)?
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denominator between cases meant that the question about reasons that further 
facilitate or restrict public engagement could be raised and systematically 
answered. It implied too that the number of cases, which included elements of 
PTA or a full PTA, might be low.
chapter 4
to what extent was
participatory tech-
nology assessment 
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Xenotransplantation policies ranged from a wait and see position in which no 
particular xenotransplantation policies were formulated (Austria) to permissive 
policies, which allow in principle clinical trials after approval by responsible 
authorities (European Commission, Italy, Latvia, OECD, Switzerland, the UK) to 
moratoria on clinical trials (Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden).* Moreover, 
there is also divergence between the countries which opted for a moratorium on 
clinical trials, with regards to its binding character. Only in the Netherlands did 
Parliament actually pass a de jure a moratorium (Versteeg/Loeber 2011). All the 
other countries decided for a de facto moratorium. The Canadian government 
did not make a declaration concerning its proposed xenotransplantation policy 
after a PTA was carried that resulted in a call for a moratorium, when no clinical 
trials were carried out either before or thereafter (Einsiedel et al. 2011). In 
Denmark it was decided that clinical trials need authorisation by the central 
national bioethics committee (Hansen 2011), and Swedish xenotransplantation 
researchers voluntarily decided to stop clinical trials (Hansson/Lundin 2011).
Intensity of Debates
How to understand the difference? A working hypothesis of the project was 
that the policies adapted on xenotransplantation were likely to be affected 
by the intensity of public attention to the xenotransplantation topic. Applying 
a distinction used by Joly and Assouline the intensity of public debate can be 
categorized as “no debate on the issue at all, in any arena”, “business as usual”, 
a “managed tension situation”, and “crisis”. Whilst the meaning of “no debate” 
is abundantly clear, the other three categories are less straightforward and need 
some clarification. In the case of “business as usual”, the “debate is confined 
within a small number of specialised arenas, for instance the scientific and 
legal ones (...). The network of government bodies in charge of the problem and 
a few stakeholders involved is stable and the definition of the issue ... is not 
controversial”. The debate in a “managed tension situation” by contrast, “involves 
a greater number of arenas and a greater interaction between” them. 
Let us now turn to policy responses to xenotransplantation in our sample 
of countries and international organisations. Interestingly, in the various 
countries under study we see a wide variety of policy responses to the issue of 
xenotransplantation. We will look at the xenotransplantation policies taken, the 
intensity and framing of public debate, whether TA and PTA were applied, the 
actors included in policy-making and the way of public involvement.
Xenotransplantation Policies
As Table 1 indicates xenotransplantation policies vary in international perspective.
Table 1: Xenotransplantation Policies in the late 1990s and early 2000
Wait and see Permissive Moratorium
AT 
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NL
OECD
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* The OECD and the Vatican have no regulatory power but recommended permissive policies.
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No debate
Business as 
usual
Managed 
tension 
situation
Crisis
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Framing
It is not just the intensity and level of controversy of public debate which plays 
a role in understanding the dynamics of the policy arenas. Equally important we 
found, is the focus of public debate on how the issue of xenotransplantation was 
problematized or ‘framed’. This process of framing, which also changed over time, 
varied considerably across our cases, and closely related to existing public debates 
about novel biotechnologies and the wider cultural context of the countries (Table 
3). In the following we will discuss the frames most frequently used.
Unsurprisingly, to assuage organ shortage was a dominant framing in almost all 
countries and international organisations studied in the CIT-PART project. No less 
expectedly, the risks of xenotransplantation, mainly of cross-species infection, 
were another dominant frame in almost all cases of debate.
Several countries and international organisations framed xenotransplantation 
in terms of economics, either by discussing its consequences on healthcare 
expenditures, but mainly as a means to boost the country’s economic 
competitiveness. This was particularly important in Sweden (which hosted 
substantial xenotransplantaion research), Switzerland (which has a large 
pharmaceutical sector), the European Commission (which for a while perceived 
xenotransplantation as economically promising), the OECD and the UK (whose 
government policy rated biotechnology as one of the main and promising sectors 
for economic growth).
There are “intense controversies on the definition of the problem and solutions”. 
The situation of “crisis” takes conflict and uncertainty even further: “The controversy 
on the specific issue is globalised and may become a serious problem for existing 
institutions. In terms of political process, actors of the social mobilisation may 
become as influential as the traditional stakeholders” (Joly/Assouline 2001: 25).
Applying these categories to our cases, Table 2 shows that there was also 
variation with regard to the intensity of debate across our countries and 
international organisations: xenotransplantation was not always controversial 
and hotly debated. Whereas in Austria and Latvia there was no debate at 
all, xenotransplantation was discussed in most countries and international 
organisations in our sample in a “business as usual” manner, and did not give 
rise to severe conflicts. In Denmark , the EC, Italy, OECD, Sweden and Vatican 
typical, country- or organisation-specific institutional arrangements were used 
to arrive at xenotransplantation policies. In the Netherlands and Switzerland, it 
could be argued that a situation of managed tension arose. In Canada and the UK, 
xenotransplantation policies became connected to previous or current scandals 
in biotechnology, food or health policies, and were therefore discussed in the 
context of a serious crisis of trust in government regulation.
Table 2: Intensity of Public Debate about Xenotransplantation
No debate
Business as 
usual
Managed 
tension 
situation
Crisis
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
(adapted from Joly/Assouline 2001: 25; own research)
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Animal welfare, though a subcategory of ethics, was also used as a frame in several 
cases. But there was an obvious division between the cases. In many countries 
the use of animals for xenotransplantation was mostly considered unproblematic 
given the already accepted practice of industrial meat production (e.g. Denmark, 
Italy and the Vatican). However, in several countries animal welfare issues 
become topical in one way or the other. In the EC the issue of experimenting 
with non-human primates was raised; in the Netherlands animal welfare issues 
converged on the question of genetic modification of animals, and the Vatican’s 
Pontifical Academy of Life discussed animal welfare issues at some length. 
The ethics of xenotransplantation became a topic of discussion only in a few 
countries. TA and PTA in Switzerland gave much thought to questions of ethics, 
as, expectedly, was also the case at the Pontifical Academy of Life (Vatican). But 
the ethics of xenotransplantation were also an important frame in Sweden, as 
can be seen from the involvement of ethicists in a parliamentary commission 
(Hansson/Lundin 2011) and in the UK. The latter was particularly influential in 
international policy development because it was the first country that regulated 
xenotransplantation.
Table 3: Framing of xenotransplantation in the late 1990s and early 2000s
Organ shortage Risk
Technical 
Challenges
Progress in 
Science and 
Technology
Competi-
tiveness and 
Economics
Ethics
Animal 
Welfare
Trust in 
Govern-
ment
Struggle 
for compe-
tencies
AT AT
CA CA
CH CH
DK DK
EC EC
GB GB
IT IT
LV LV
NL NL
OECD OECD
SE SE
VA VA
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It is interesting to note that animal welfare organisations in almost all countries, 
including those which set up participatory arrangements, found entry into the 
debate difficult (see Box 1). The difficulties mainly resulted from the animal 
organisations’ challenge to the dominant framing of xenotransplantation as a 
benign economic and medical option. Their failing attempts to be taken seriously 
as a dialogue partner illuminate the restrictions in the openness of the public 
debate that some countries organised. The Dutch case is exemplary in this respect. 
Box 1 Involvement of Animal Welfare Organisations
The involvement of animal welfare organisations, known to be very critical 
of xenotransplantation, was largely considered to be a delicate and difficult 
issue. Within our cases there was great variation in how animal welfare 
organisations were treated in TA and PTA arrangements.
First, in one group of countries animal activists were simply not present. 
This is true for Austria, where animal welfare organisations did not engage 
in a debate due to a lack of resources. In Italy animal welfare organisations 
had little say in the public debate, apart from a post-card campaign of Nobel 
laureate Dario Fo against xenotransplantation. The OECD included one 
animal welfare organisation only as listener at one of her conferences. The 
opposite was true in Denmark, where animal protection organisations did not 
engage in the xenotransplantation debate because there were, according to 
an interviewee, “plenty of other, more pressing animal welfare issues” which 
did not involve such “complex problems pertaining to the welfare of human 
beings” (Hansen 2011: 24).
In another group of countries animal welfare organisations were deliberately 
excluded from the TA, which in some cases caused problems later on.
At the Pontifical Academy of Life animal welfare organisations (as well 
as patient organisations) did not have a seat in the working group, and 
later critique by the British group “Catholic Concern for Animals” had little 
impact in the Academy. In Sweden the animal welfare organisations neither 
succeeded in presenting their views in the media, nor did they have a seat 
in the parliamentary commission. They criticized the organisers for not 
recognising them as legitimate peers in this commission, but rather treating 
them as stakeholders of an interest group who were invited to a meeting 
once. The commission considered that animal rights should be appropriately 
represented by an expert in agricultural science, a claim which animal rights 
activists contested.
Several British animal welfare organisations voiced immense opposition 
against xenotransplantation. However, they were excluded from the formal 
policy process. In a bottom-up attempt to shape the xenotransplantation 
policy process they submitted reports to United Kingdom Xenotranplantation 
Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA) commissioned surveys on peoples’ 
attitudes towards xenotransplantation, organised post-card campaigns, 
petitioned Members of Parliament, attended UKXIRA public meetings, and 
published leaked confidential data about industry’s xenotransplantation 
research, claiming that industry had failed to make technical progress 
towards clinical xenotransplantation, and that its research had subjected 
non-human primates to severe suffering (Diaries of Despair). The influence of 
these activities on British xenotransplantation policies is contested. Animal 
activists claimed that the leaked data in particular contributed to the collapse 
in expectations amongst the UK policy community concerning the future of 
xenotransplantation, and led to the subsequent disbanding of the UKXIRA. 
In contrast, some regulators depicted “Uncaged Campaigns”, who published 
this report, as a group of ‘extremists’ whose submissions could not be taken 
seriously by a regulatory body (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011: 29, 36 ff.).
At EC level the involvement of animal rights activists was limited and caused 
conflicts later on. In November 2008 the Scientific Committee on Health and 
Environmental Risks (SCHER) organised a public hearing on the use of non-
human primates in research. The European Coalition on the End of Animal 
Experiments (ECEAE), who participated in both the consultation and the 
hearing, contested SCHER’s Opinion. They forwarded a complaint with the 
Ombudsman of the EU, claiming that the working group did not have enough 
expertise in the area of non-human primates research and did not take into 
account the latest scientific evidence and statements made by interest groups 
on alternatives to non-human primate research. ECEAE challenged the Opinion 
using scientific arguments, contesting how adequate and comprehensive the 
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Another important framing in some countries concerned trust in government 
regulation which was severely shaken by previous scandals in blood contamination 
(Canada, Einsiedel et al. 2011: 13), BSE and GMO food (UK).
Committee’s scientific evidence was (Griessler et al. 2012a).
The involvement of animal welfare organisations was much more intense yet 
equally delicate in countries with PTA exercises. In Switzerland, civil societies’ 
activities in regards to xenotransplantation contributed and were connected 
to the legislative process. The Non-governmental organisation (NGO) Basel 
Appeal was very active in raising and debating the issue of xenotransplantation. 
It produced an extensive information brochure, collected 6,500 signatures 
demanding a moratorium on xenotransplantation, contributed to the 
consultation procedure for the relevant laws, gave interviews to the press, 
and participated as an invited expert in the PubliForum. Basel Forum also had 
connections to Parliament since one of the members of its board was also a 
member of the Federal Assembly. She initiated an interpellation and a motion 
for a moratorium on xenotransplantation in 1996 (Griessler 2011:22). Also, in 
the Netherlands animal rights organisations had an active voice in the debate 
yet experienced considerable opposition. The views of one organisation were 
included in an educational leaflet, and the animal rights activists’ perspectives 
on xenotransplantation were presented in a theater play which was performed 
at schools. The small “Working Group Xenotransplantation Question”, however, 
opposed xenotransplantation fundamentally and criticized it from both an 
economic and an animal welfare perspective. They engaged as activists and 
visitors in public meetings and complained that the debate did not provide 
a space for their alternative discourse. Nevertheless their criticism was 
mentioned in the final report on the PTA. In Canada the most important animal 
welfare organisations took a moderate stance towards xenotransplantation, 
and were also involved in the participatory exercise. A more radical animal 
welfare organisation had little prominence on the public stage.
In the Netherlands xenotransplantation also became framed in terms of a 
conflict in the executive-legislative relationship between government and 
Parliament about the mandate of newly established expert commissions, and 
questioned whether Parliament or this expert body should decide on clinical 
xenotransplantation research.
Expert TA and PTA
To what extent were TA and PTA used in different countries and international 
organisations in xenotransplantation policy-making and to what extent were 
experts, stakeholders and the public involved in these endeavours?
Table 4: To what extent was TA and PTA used in the case of xenotransplantation?
Expert TA
Stakeholder 
PTA
Public PTA
Academic 
Participatory 
experiments
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Involvement
A further dimension of our comparison relates to those actors that were active in 
the policy arenas and who shaped policy responses to the scientific developments 
in xenotransplantation. In order to analyse this, we designed a classification of 
different types of actors to map our cases, including civil servants, scientists, 
ethicists, politicians, stakeholders, NGOs and citizens (see Table 5).
Table 4 shows that expert TA dominated policy advice on xenotransplantation 
policies. All but one country based their xenotransplantation policies in some 
way on experts’ advice. However, it must be remembered that the scope and 
thoroughness of advisory exercises and papers varied considerably between 
countries, ranging from a two page paper to full-blown and elaborate TA studies.
In contrast, only a small minority of governments and international organisations 
commissioned or supported PTA exercises to involve the public (Canada, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland). In addition, academics in Austria and the UK 
initiated and carried out participatory exercises to experiment with citizen 
participation. Also the European Commission supported such experiments within 
its Framework Programmes. However, these experiments had little direct impact 
on decision-making in xenotransplantation policies.
Table 5: Involvement in Xenotransplantation Policy-Making
Civil Service Scientists Ethicists Politicians Stakeholder NGO Citizens
AT AT
LV LV
EC EC
OECD OECD
IT IT
V V
DK DK
SE SE
GB GB
CA CA
CH CH
NL NL
Legend: ¢ = very strong role ¢ = strong ¢ = weak role  = very weak
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some countries stakeholders were not at all involved and in others less intensely 
(Denmark, Sweden). At the EC level stakeholder involvement included the 
possibility of public hearings which, however, were strictly framed by scientific 
questions.
NGOs were involved in a few countries only. Particularly animal welfare 
organisations faced difficulties at times to participate (see Box 1) because 
groups considered radical often found it difficult to participate (UK, EC), whereas 
moderate activists became involved (Canada, Netherlands). In some countries 
animal welfare organisations didn’t engage in the topic at all, either because 
of lack of resources (Austria) or because they considered other topics more 
important (Denmark). Patient groups also acted strategically and either decided 
to participate in the debate or not (see Box 2).
Citizens became actively involved in xenotransplantation policies in just a 
small minority of cases. In Austria, Italy, Latvia, the Vatican and the OECD there 
was almost no involvement of the public apart from information (see Table 6). 
However, in Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, there were attempts to involve 
the public more strongly.
Table 5 shows that regulation of xenotransplantation was primarily a business of 
civil servants and experts. Only in a minority of cases elected politicians became 
directly involved and only in a few countries also stakeholder organisations and 
citizens had a chance to contribute to policy development.
As shown by Table 5, the civil service played a very strong and decisive role in 
almost all cases. The category of civil service includes not only ministries, but 
importantly also organisations such as parliamentarian technology assessment 
units and agencies at government’s arm’s length. In some cases civil service kept 
xenotransplantation policies completely within its remit (Austria and Latvia), in 
other cases civil servants organized the TA process, were involved in discussions 
of regulation, were regulating (United Kingdom Xenotransplantation Interim 
Regulatory Authority, UKXIRA), initiated (Canada, Netherlands) or contributed 
(Switzerland) to the PTA process. At the Holy See the civil servants did initiate the 
TA, but were not influential in formulating its opinion.
Next to civil servants, scientists were the most important and influential actors in 
xenotransplantation policies. They were crucially involved in TA and contributed 
to PTA; in Sweden they initiated the establishment of a parliamentary commission 
to regulate xenotransplantation. Scientists, together with civil servants, formed 
the core of an international community of experts and regulators who discussed 
xenotransplantation policies in different international forums, such as the WHO, 
the OECD and the Council of Europe.
Ethicists played a less important role and were only heavily involved in a few 
countries (Canada, Sweden, Vatican and the UK). In other countries they played 
a less important role or none at all. At EC level, for example, ethical issues were 
regularly mentioned in reports of competent scientific committees but were 
never actually addressed in detail (Griessler et al. 2012a).
Politicians, including legislative as well as executive, became involved in 
xenotransplantation policies in a few countries only. In Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland, xenotransplantation became a topic of – sometimes 
passionate parliamentary debate. In Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland the 
responsible ministers supported the idea of a PTA.
Stakeholder, involvement , i. e. mainly science and industry, was strong in some 
countries, such as the UK, Canada, Switzerland and the Netherlands. However, in 
Box 2: Involvement of Patients Organisations
Patient groups were often considered important actors and stakeholders in 
the xenotransplantation debate. Again our sample shows the variation in 
their involvements:
In one group of countries and organisations, consisting of Austria, Denmark, 
Italy, Latvia, the EC and the Vatican, patient organisations were either not 
at all, or only very loosely involved in TA or PTA. At the Pontifical Academy 
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Public Involvement
Now let us investigate in what way the public became involved in xenotransplan-
tation policies.
Table 6: How was the Public involved?
Survey Information Consultation Discussion
AT
CA
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for Life, patients’ organisations (as well as animal welfare activists) were 
considered difficult to include because they would not be ready for dialogue. 
Instead, it was assumed that knowledgeable experts would take into account 
what they considered to be the public’s concerns. At the OECD level two 
patient organisations participated in a workshop about xenotransplantation. 
One of them, the Islet Foundation, strongly supported xenotransplantation 
as a potential approach for curing diabetes.
But patient organisations also deliberately decided not to engage in 
xenotransplantation debates, because they considered other alternatives 
more promising and important. The Dutch Kidney Foundation considered 
xenotransplantation to be morally sensitive, and not a preferred solution to 
the shortage of organs. They chose to focus on other measures to assuage 
organ shortage, and did not actively contribute to the xenotransplantation 
debate (Versteeg/Loeber 2011: 46). Also in Denmark “the most likely group 
of patients to benefit from whole organ XTP – kidney patients – expressed an 
outspoken dismay for the idea and did not engage in the debate at all “ (Hansen 
2011: 31). Similarly, in the UK, patient groups have been relatively quiet 
regarding xenotransplantation. The National Kidney Federation, for example, 
issued a statement cautiously supporting xenotransplantation providing that 
alternatives were vigorously pursued. However, patient organisation were much 
less prominent in the debate than opponents (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011: 36).
By contrast, in Canada a small patient organisation in favour of advancing islet 
transplantation was involved in stakeholder consultations, and transplant 
patients participated as ‘experts’ in the citizen jury public consultations. In 
Switzerland the advisory groups to the TA and PTA on xenotransplantation 
included patient organisation representatives. In Sweden patient 
organisations supported xenotransplantation and were eager to see this 
research evolve into a viable medical technology. They were able to act as 
stakeholders in the early stages of xenotransplantation research because 
scientists regularly disseminated their newest research results in meetings 
with patients. Some patient organisations also commented on the report of 
the parliamentary committee.
Legend: ¢ = very strong role ¢ = strong ¢ = weak role  = very weak
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The strongest form of citizen involvement was discussing xenotransplantation 
policies with citizens in two-way communication. As already said, this course was 
taken in three countries, Canada, Switzerland and Netherlands, where citizen 
forums (Canada), a PubliForum (Switzerland), and public discussions after a play 
(Netherlands) were organized. Also in the EC SCHER provided an opportunity 
for public discussion, although access was limited, and the debate was narrowly 
framed by scientific questions.
The CIT-PART project shows that citizens were involved in various ways in TA 
and PTA, and that a focus on those arrangements that are formally labelled “PTA” 
hides from view the many ways in which citizens were also involved on an issue 
such as xenotransplantation.
Looking at Table 6, the weakest form of public involvement was polling. Surveys 
were done in almost all countries which were EU Member States in the late 
1990s, because two Eurobarometer surveys carried out in these years included 
questions on xenotransplantation (Allansdottir 2010). In addition to these EU-
funded Eurobarometer surveys there were national surveys which addressed 
the general public and potentially affected patient groups in several countries 
as part of the xenotransplantation policy process and TA (Canada, Netherland, 
Sweden and the UK). In Italy polling was part of academic research.
A further step towards public involvement was information for the public. In 
almost all cases information was provided for the public in one way or another. 
These efforts were strongest in Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland 
where governments were proactive in using different approaches to inform the 
public. However, in some countries information was less comprehensive and only 
meant putting the outcome of TA on the Internet (European Commission, Italy, 
OECD and the Vatican). A special case was the UK, where annual meetings of 
the United Kingdom Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA) 
were open to the public, and UKXIRA’s annual reports were published. In the case 
of Latvia information for the public included only the participation in the EU-
funded project DECIDE, which resulted in the information of a limited number of 
students who were involved in this project.
In a minority of cases, i.e. Canada, Netherlands and Switzerland, the general 
public and/or NGOs were involved by consultation, i.e. they were invited by 
on-line surveys, letters, etc. to voice their opinion about xenotransplantation 
policies. In the UK, both the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1996) as well as the 
Department of Health (Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation 
1997, Kennedy Report) invited stakeholders to comment on xenotransplantation 
policies for TA. Stakeholders were also consulted in the Swiss TA exercise. In 
Sweden the parliamentary commission on xenotransplantation listened to NGOs 
as informants. The EC’s Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks 
(SCHER) provided opportunities for NGOs for consultation, however these were 
limited to purely scientific questions.
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there are assessments that embrace a wider range of loci, such as industry and 
society writ large, and that take into account other manifestations of impact 
(such as an increase in media coverage) in their analyses, a so-called ‘second 
generation’ of impact studies. 
First Generation of Impact Criteria
The first generation of impact studies mainly hinges on two assessment criteria: 
access to political power and participants’ influence vis-à-vis formal political 
institutions (e.g. Fiorino 1990; Laird 1993; Collins/Evans 2002; Rowe/Frewer 
2000). Exemplary of this perspective on impact assessment is Renn et al.’s 
(1993) approach, which defines a PTA’s impact as the “[i]ntegration into the 
political decision process” of the outcome of the PTA that is drawn up after the 
participatory event has come to an end” (1993:199). In general, assessment studies 
organised on the basis of this definition of impact have been particularly critical 
of the impacts of PTA. The general assessment is that “only a few participatory 
procedures actually have some empirical impact on political decision-making” 
(Abels 2007: 110, cf. Joss 1998, Bütschi/Nentwich 2002).
Indeed, when judged in these terms, none of the three PTAs under scrutiny in 
the CIT-PART project has been influential. In the Swiss case, the PTA’s impact in 
terms of ‘first generation’ assessment criteria may be considered limited simply 
because the PTA’s final plenary session took place a few days after the Health 
Ministry sent a bill on the issue to Parliament. The PTA in Switzerland, called 
PubliForum, was designed after the Danish consensus conference model (Klüver 
2002), and involved 28 citizens selected to represent the Swiss population. To 
ensure a connection with the formal policy process, TA Swiss organized this event 
together with the Federal Office of Public Health and the Swiss National Science 
Foundation. Still, impact was limited if understood in terms of Renn et al’s 1993 
definition, which directs the attention to a PTA’s influence after the participatory 
event has come to an end. Since decisions were made prior to the reception of the 
PTA’s output, strictly speaking no impact can be assigned to it (Griessler 2011).
Experimentation with public engagement in policy-making on technological 
developments went hand in hand with a call for a systematic evaluation of its 
design and impacts (Abels 2007). A wealth of impact studies have been produced 
since, many of which were funded by the European Commission. The CIT-PART 
project can be viewed as part of this tradition. A red thread running through these 
PTA assessment studies is the attention for the complexity of conceptualising the 
notion of ‘impact’, and relating it both to a PTA’s design and to its wider (national) 
context. The CIT-PART project is no exception in that respect. The question of 
what constitutes ‘impact’ was a dominant theme in the discussions and working 
documents produced within the project (Biegelbauer et al. 2010). Reminiscent 
of Abels’ (2007: 105) remark that a conceptualisation of impact requires “a 
theoretical framework about the functioning of policy-making”, in the project 
we developed a way to assess a PTA’s impact drawing on McAdam et al. (2001) 
‘dynamics of contention’ (DOC) theory. This approach, which is positioned as 
an incipient ‘third generation’ of impact assessment studies, and its up-shot in 
terms of the PTAs on xenotransplantation included in the project, will be outlined 
below. First, the CIT-PART project is positioned in the tradition of (EU-funded) 
impact assessment studies, in what is dubbed here as several ‘generations’ of 
impact assessment.
Impact assessment of PTAs
The best way to assess impact is both a conceptual and a methodological puzzle. 
Moreover, the two questions are interconnected. The methods for assessing impacts 
depend on the conceptualisation of what counts as impact. Generally speaking, in 
the conceptualisation of what constitutes an impact, a dichotomy can be observed.
On the one hand, there are studies that focus exclusively on political decision-
making as a locus for identifying impacts, and on changes in such decisions as 
their manifestation. These, we have argued in the CIT-PART project (Loeber et al. 
2011), may be referred to as a ‘first generation’ of impact studies. Additionally 
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In the case of Canada, again impact when assessed in these terms is found to be 
poor, if not non-existent. In Canada, an extensive design for public consultation 
and engagement in processes of political will formation on xenotransplantation 
was developed. The consultation framework consisted of a “representative” model, 
and an “open” model (see Figure 1, p. 63). These terms were used to reflect the 
idea of balancing self-selected participation with the ideal of representativeness.
A similar conclusion can be drawn on the Dutch case. In the Netherlands, in 1999, 
a campaign called “Xenotransplantation, is it and should it be possible?” was 
initiated by the Ministry of Health. It was initiated on request notably of members 
of Parliament, who thought the ethical dimensions of the issue warranted the 
involvement of citizens in the debate and implemented by Consumer and 
Biotechnology, a small issue organisation. The PTA consisted of an information 
campaign, followed by a public debate which included various activities, such 
as surveys, a website, and public discussions. Furthermore, it featured a theatre 
play dramatizing the discussion on xenotransplantation, which toured schools 
and other venues, in order to reach a wide, young, audience. 
As was the case in Switzerland, timing issues prevent us from assigning any impact 
to the Dutch PTA in terms of the first generation impact assessment criteria: the 
public debate started only after parliament had decided for a moratorium and 
by the time the PTA’s final end-report was made public, the Dutch parliament 
had already decided on a formal ban on xenotransplantation. Judging by this, 
the PTA came after-the-fact and so cannot be ascribed any formal impact strictly 
speaking (Versteeg/Loeber 2011).
PubliForum Transplantationsmedizin © TA-Swiss
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Second and Third Generation of Impact Criteria* 
Yet rather than doubting the potentiality of PTAs ever to be effective at all, 
these CIT-PART findings draw attention to the need to rethink the assumptions 
underlying this ‘first generation’ approach to conceptualising impact. This 
perspective on assessing the impact of citizen participation quintessentially 
builds on what Warren (2001, 2002) identifies as a “bipolar model” of state-
society relations. The bipolar model divides society into two spheres,
a) the sphere of the “coercive, legal, and administrative powers of the state” and
b) the sphere of civil society, dominated by non-state actors and their relations 
that play out in “norms, cultural habits, discussion, and agreement”.
According to Warren, the bipolar model “generalizes by default the idea that the 
state is the sole agent of power within a society of otherwise voluntary relations” 
(2001: 43), and obscures the fact that associations of non-state actors, with or 
without including state-actors “can and often do serve as alternative modes of 
governance” (2001: 33).
Within the policy sciences the model has been severely criticized for falling 
short of providing a clear view on the complex networked if not corporatist (e.g. 
Akkerman et al. 2004) relations between state and society. Likewise, in the field 
of science and technology studies and TA, authors point out that the ‘social map’ 
of deliberation and decision-making on technological development (Vergragt/
Jansen, 1993) is far more complex than can be covered with such a dichotomized 
perspective. Moreover, the process of political decision-making on technology is 
far too muddled, some argue, to restrict impact assessment to changes in formal 
policy decisions (Joly/Assouline 2001, Joss/Bellucci 2002, Decker/Ladikas 2004). 
These reflections have informed what we in the CIT-PART project have dubbed 
a ‘second generation’ of impact studies. Rejecting a narrow definition of impact, 
which restricts the definition of influence of a PTA to the policy-makers’ final 
decision (e.g. a law or other regulation), authors of this generation have developed 
a “multifaceted view” (Bellucci et al. 2002: 282) on impact assessment. What 
In contrast to the Dutch and Swiss cases, Canadian efforts’ lack of evidence of 
impact was not an issue of chronology. Rather, the Canadian PTA’s outcome 
– the decision that Canada should refrain from approving clinical trials of 
xenotransplantation until critical issues were resolved, and other options to 
address the critical organ shortage could be explored – failed to have an impact 
because ever since this verdict the Canadian government has made no definitive 
statements about xenotransplantation (Einsiedel et al. 2011).
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presuppose one another. More particularly, in the case of newly developing 
technologies, such as xenotransplantation, an issue may be taking shape out 
of sight of potentially interested or otherwise affected citizens. A PTA may 
well present a first source of information, and may present the very reason for 
citizens to become involved (rather than being a means to express their prior 
engagement). To take this into account, the temporal aspects of the staging 
of the PTA in view of the issue’s development require attention, beyond the 
mere ‘one-off’ moment of handing over a final report.
2. The extent to which a PTA performs a “brokering” role: did it contribute to 
connecting previously unconnected social sites or actors and actor groups 
engaged in will-formation and decision-making on the issue? Understanding 
the state as a multitude of venues for participation in public conversations 
and political judgement as opposed to a uniform, bounded political unit with 
a singular, linear process of will-formation, the question is not only which 
venues are more decisive in terms of formal political power, but also one of 
effective accumulation or ‘brokerage’, connecting actor groups. This is tied up 
with the extent to which the TA is complementary to existing platforms, for 
citizens and others (state-actors, experts, civil society organisations etc.) to 
meet and engage in an exchange of thoughts on an issue.
3. The extent to which a PTA contributes to the “formation of new categories”, 
the drawing or activation of boundaries between existing categories and the 
development of a ‘shared identity’ between actors who identified themselves 
previously in other terms: did the PTA enable a so-called ‘issue public’ of 
interested citizens or actor groups to emerge? In social theory on the issue, 
the emergence of a public, if not considered a ‘given’, is often assumed to 
take place spontaneously (Marres, 2006). Yet in the case of a PTA, the parties 
responsible for designing the PTA events may well have an active role in 
creating a public as a new category, questioning existing roles and forging a 
new identity in the light of the issue at stake, and/or shifting the focus of an 
actor group’s attention.
these studies have in common is that they ignore the traditional distinction 
between public TA (i.e. TA exercises intended to influence policy-makers) and 
constructive TA (i.e. TA schemes intended to influence technologists to include 
societal and user perspectives in their designs; cf. Schot/Rip 1997). Instead they 
seek to include a wide range of actor groups as potential addressees. Additionally, 
they broaden the definition of impact so as to include a TA event’s ‘resonance,’ in 
the words of Hennen (2002: 262), such as its effect on raising awareness, shaping 
attitudes and initializing (non-state actor’s) actions. Thus, this second generation 
of impact assessment studies emphasizes the need to look at the full plethora 
of relevant actors when assessing the impact of a PTA, as well as to acknowledge 
‘softer’ impacts such as policy-oriented learning, in addition to concrete policy 
change (Abels 2010; cf. Jamison 1998; Joly/Assouline 2001; Joss/Bellucci 2002; 
Decker/Ladikas 2004; Bora/Hausendorf, 2004).
Building on these views on impact, and given the project’s focus on the political 
context of PTA, the CIT-PART project has developed a take on impact assessment 
which emphasises a PTA’s role in providing an additional arena of political 
contestation. We understand the, often multiple, events comprising a PTA as 
sites for deliberation on the issue under scrutiny, which are called into being 
next to other, more permanent arenas for deliberation and contestation, and as 
such may influence processes of meaning-making and will-formation in their 
particular contexts. Building on McAdam et al. (2001) “dynamics of contention” 
(DOC) theory, the CIT-PART project developed an understanding of impact that 
includes:
1. The extent to which a PTA enables “diffusion”: does the PTA provide an 
opportunity for state and non-state actors to make (aspects of) the issue 
known to a broader audience that previously wasn't aware of it? The focus 
on diffusion builds on the contention that it should not be taken for granted 
that a (policy) issue has a given audience of interested citizens. As various 
authors have pointed out (Dewey 1991 [1927], Marres, 2006), issues 
do not form in splendid isolation, nor do their publics: issues and publics 
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Brokerage
The PTA had a distinct impact. Most notably, an unexpected, temporary coalition 
emerged between animal welfare organisations, rallying against the genetic 
modification of donor animals for xenotransplantation, and patient interest 
groups focusing on xenotransplantation in the context of a shortage of organ 
4. The extent to which a PTA serves to (de-) legitimize and (de-) validate actors’ 
claims, that is, in terms of McAdams et al. (2001) to (de)certify claims and 
their claimants: did the PTA present an opportunity for certain actor groups to 
strengthen their claim to validity, legitimacy or truth? Attention to this issue 
opens up a way to assess a PTA’s impact in challenging or reinforcing (aspects 
of) the existing regime and claims on dominance of certain mechanisms and 
actor groups in handling an issue.
Although this list is by no means exhaustive, it provides a starting point for 
exploring the various ways a PTA may impact on the policy-field in which political 
will-formation and judgment on a (newly developing) technology are playing out.
Netherlands
The PTA in the Netherlands was initiated in 1999 by the Ministry of Health, at 
the request of Members of Parliament, who thought the ethical dimensions 
of the xenotransplantation issue warranted the involvement of citizens in the 
debate. The objectives were to stimulate the opinion shaping of the regulation of 
xenotransplantation and associated issues, and to generate input into that process.
Its impact in terms of the assessment criteria laid out above may be assessed as 
follows:
Diffusion
The PTA may be considered a success. It succeeded, using a website, free cards and 
free publicity in the national media to make xenotransplantation known to a wider 
audience that it was previously unaware of it. In turn, it helped to shape the issue by 
sparking new publics into being: because of the PTA, one-time anti-biotechnology 
campaigners established the “Working Group (Xeno-)transplantation Questions”. 
While not too successful at getting its views acknowledged in the PTA, members 
agree that the TA provided a platform for voicing their views, whilst enabling other 
actors to express their views in its slipstream.
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critical evaluation of the debate. Yet the debate was certified and considered to 
be legitimizing by the Minister of Health when she wrote in a letter to Parliament 
that the results of the debate corresponded with her own views on the subject, 
and so she used them to defend her policy decision to ban xenotransplantation.
Switzerland
The Swiss PTA was preceded by an expert TA on xenotransplantation, which also 
had elements of consultation by inviting stakeholders to comment on their view 
on this medical technology. PTA built upon lessons learned from other PTAs 
initiated by TA Swiss and in other TA-related organisations. To ensure a connection 
with the formal policy process, TA Swiss organized this event together with the 
Ministry and the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Its impact in terms of the criteria laid out here can be assessed as follows:
Diffusion
The PTA was a success. It was one among several instruments used by TA Swiss as a 
means of examining xenotransplantation, and it also served to spread information 
about the topic to the public. TA Swiss published the results of their TA studies 
and presented them to the media and Members of Parliament. PubliForum’s 
results were published, thus helping to make (aspects of) xenotransplantation 
known to a broader audience, who had previously been unaware of it.
Brokerage
The PTA had an impact in these terms. It helped to make a connection between 
the actors professionally involved in law-making (Parliament and the responsible 
ministry), ordinary citizens and several NGOs (Griessler 2011). For the Ministry, 
the PubliForum was a way of obtaining additional input into the law-making 
process about what ‘the public’s’ thoughts on transplantation were. This served 
the Ministry well as it conflicted with some experts over the cautious approach 
towards transplantation and xenotransplantation that it had developed. Some 
experts thought that the Ministry might hamper medical progress. Furthermore, it 
served as a broker by connecting previously separate policy fields (biotechnology 
and organ donation), and their associated actor groups.
donors. In the first place, both groups were unhappy with the PTA. Patient 
organisations argued that it addressed ‘the wrong issue’ (they preferred a 
discussion about the donor registration system) and feared that talking about 
xenotransplantation would discourage human donors. The animal welfare 
organisations, who vehemently opposed xenotransplantation, could not afford 
to look self-centered, as if they cared only for the interests of animals and not 
the people dying due to the dearth of organ donors. Subsequently, animal 
welfare organisations found themselves encouraging their members to register 
as donors. While this coalition dissolved in the face of subsequent issues, the PTA 
definitely implied a brokerage between these groups. The resulting alteration 
in relations between claimants and objects of claims may be understood as an 
example of an object shift resulting from it.
Category formation
In these terms the PTA had quite an impact. Through its staging a common 
identity was forged between a diverse set of actors, namely patients and 
vegetarians. Both were considered to hold privileged positions within the 
debate, as if they were endowed with an intrinsic right to speak. Yet interestingly, 
this identity cum right was to a large extent fictitious. The xenotransplantation 
protagonists and opponents’ debate created a discursive identity of these 
groups, while actual patient organisations were in fact wary of the new technology 
(see Box 2) and vegetarians did not claim their right to speak (Versteeg/Loeber, 
2011). Furthermore, evidence of boundary activation is found in parliamentary 
proceedings that show how the PTA gave rise to reflections about the primacy of 
politics and, more particularly, about the appropriate role of parliament vis-à-vis 
the public and the expertise of scientists.
(De)certification
The PTA was regarded as a satisfactory arrangement by various actors to different 
degrees, and served, in turn, to lend certain actors relevance and legitimacy. 
Some doubted the PTA’s relevance (notably biotechnologists), and/or its timing. 
Government actors questioned the representativeness of the PTA. The above 
mentioned “Working Group (Xeno-) transplantation Questions” wrote its own, 
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were activities based on an open model, which provided an opportunity for 
self-selected participants to voice their opinions on xenotransplantation. This 
included a website survey, a mail-in survey, letters, e-mails and public forums (see 
Figure 1). The outcome of the consultation was that “Canada should refrain from 
approving clinical trials of xenotransplantation until critical issues were resolved, 
and other options to address the critical organ shortage could be explored” 
(Einsiedel et al. 2011: 28). So far there have been no clinical xenotransplantation 
trials in Canada.
Figure 1: Public Engagement Consultation Framework
Category formation
PubliForum was one of an assortment of arrangements which contributed to 
processes of category formation and boundary activation. In the early phases 
of xenotransplantation regulation, a social democrat Member of Parliament who 
was also a biotechnology-opposing NGO board member, voiced concerns about 
infection risks and animal rights in an interpellation in Parliament (Nationalrat 
1996). She pleaded for a moratorium on xenotransplantation research. 
Although her interpellation failed to achieve a majority in its favor, it did lead 
to the responsible parliamentary committee asking for provisional regulation of 
xenotransplantation, until such time as a transplantation law could be enacted 
(Nationalrat 1997). From then onwards, xenotransplantation was predominantly 
considered to be a public health issue. PubliForum strengthened this framing and 
contributed to marginalizing animal rights issues further still.
(De)certification
Supported by important stakeholders, PubliForum was considered a valid 
approach to obtaining the views of ‘the public’. The Ministry used the resulting data 
to defend a cautious approach towards transplantation and xenotransplantation. 
Like the Dutch case, but with a different result, PubliForum’s outcome was in 
line with the Ministry’s view and that of the Federal Assembly: a majority voted 
against a moratorium.
Canada
The PTA in Canada was initiated by Health Canada and supported by the 
responsible Minister. It was part of a more comprehensive strategy to acquire 
information about xenotransplantation, which included expert, stakeholder and 
public involvement. It was motivated by the need to define Canadian policies 
in the unchartered area of xenotransplantation, as well as a lack of trust in 
government regulation at the time, resulting from a previous scandal involving 
contaminated blood supplies. The carefully planned PTA approach, which, because 
xenotransplantation was recognized as a cross-cutting issue, was preceded by 
intradepartmental consultations, included a representative model with citizen 
forums in different Canadian regions and a telephone survey. Moreover there 
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quickly become informed on xenotransplantation” (ibid. 35). There is evidence 
of institutional learning – expressed in established routines – as a medium- and 
long-term effect of the public consultation. This includes openness towards 
actors outside the sanctioned regulatory offices, transparency and accountability 
in the governance of Canadian health (ibid. 36 ff.).
Conclusion
Of the three cases of formal PTA included in the CIT-PART project, none could be 
argued to have had an impact on the formal decision-making process in traditional, 
direct, ‘first generation’ terms. When assessed in terms of the proposed political 
process-oriented framework, this image of a total lack of impact shifts towards a 
more subtle understanding of how the three cases influenced the field in which 
the policy-making processes took shape.
The use of the framework for impact assessment developed in the CIT-PART 
project, drawing on McAdam et al.’s (2001) DOC theory, helped us to see that, 
although the impact of the investigated PTAs was limited in terms of the traditional 
first generation assessment approach, nevertheless important changes occurred 
due to a PTA. While a cross-country comparison is inevitably complicated by 
the incompatibility of the national, political, cultural and institutional contexts 
in which the PTAs were staged, we can draw several inferences from the data 
collected in the CIT-PART project.
In the Netherlands and in Switzerland, xenotransplantation did not present a 
major societal controversy. In fact, the respective PTAs in both countries generated 
public attention for the issue. The Dutch and the Swiss PTAs each offered a timely 
occasion and a new space for actor groups that were previously uninvolved or 
only loosely involved and interconnected, to learn about xenotransplantation, to 
help frame it in the context of their respective professions, and to relate to one 
another in previously unexpected coalitions. While the PTAs may have had little 
‘formal’ influence on the decision-making process, judging from the timing of 
their output, they both provided an opportunity for citizens to become active and 
presented them with a space where new coalitions could emerge. Furthermore, 
Diffusion
As already described there was more than adequate information provision to 
the public available in the Canadian case. This included ministry websites on the 
issue, some media coverage (television, radio and print media) and considerable 
information provided to the PTA participants.
Brokerage
In the mid-1990s Health Canada, the responsible federal department for health, 
faced several severe problems regarding xenotransplantation. It considered 
applications for clinical trials imminent, at which point it would have to respond 
within a 30-day review period. However, Health Canada at that time lacked the 
appropriate expertise for such decisions. Moreover a previous scandal involving 
contaminated blood supplies severely undermined public trust in government 
regulation. In addition Health Canada recognized that xenotransplantation would 
not only include technical, but also inherently basic ethical questions. It therefore 
took an approach which included national and international experts, stakeholders 
and the Canadian public. The events organized in the course of consultation 
such as, for example, The National Forum and the Public Engagement Planning 
Workshop, extolled this approach of bringing together these different groups.
Category formation
PTA participants were able to reframe the issue of xenotransplantation as suggested 
by Health Canada. The question posed to the PTA participants was very specific: 
should Canada proceed to clinical trials. The citizen participants considered the 
xenotransplantation issue to be much broader and discussed issues of health 
resources, animal welfare, ethics, and alternatives to xenotransplantation, 
regulatory standards and regulatory preparedness (Einsiedel et al. 2011: 34).
(De)certification
Two evaluations commissioned by Health Canada assessed the design and 
implementation of the public consultation positively. The citizen forums were 
considered “as the most valuable method to glean public input, transparency, 
and the capacity for individuals without professional scientific training to 
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What was the direct impact of TA on policy-making?
Table 7 provides an overview on the direct impact of TA activities in our cases on 
policy making.
Table 7: Overview on impact of TA exercises on policy-making
High direct impact
Mixed or little direct 
impact
No direct impact
AT 
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
OECD
SE
VA
Table 7 shows that TA had a high direct impact in some cases. In Austria no TA was 
carried out. In Denmark a conference was organized at Copenhagen University 
and was picked up by concerned politicians from a Christian Democratic party, 
which in general was sceptical towards modern biotechnology. They initiated 
a hearing for parliamentarians and questioned the responsible ministers for 
health and justice. They initiated a debate in Danish Parliament. This resulted in 
an informal, de facto moratorium not by legislation but by instruction from the 
Ministry of Health to public universities and research hospitals. In addition an 
expert commission (Genetechnology Commission) was formed, which concluded 
that apart from this de facto moratorium no further regulatory measures were 
required.
at least in the Swiss case, it is clear that the staging of the PTA was a means of 
developing a consensus on how to regulate xenotransplantation (with caution 
yet without recourse to a formal moratorium). This consensus developed along 
with the PTA exercise without its entering the formal process, strictly speaking, as 
a concrete external input at a specific moment in time. With regard to the Dutch 
case it is, of course, hard to ascertain whether the effects that were observed 
would also have occurred without the PTA. This particularly applies to the 
observed effect on legitimisation and ‘boundary activation’: the debate gave rise 
to meta-reflections in parliamentary politics e.g. on the relevance of initiating 
public debates such as this PTA.
In Canada the promises and unpredictability of, and the insecurity about science, 
the regulatory challenges posed by xenotransplantation, and a crisis of trust in 
government regulation resulting from the previous scandal about contaminated 
blood supplies provided a fertile ground for institutional innovation and learning 
towards accountability, transparency and openness. Though it is hard to link 
the outcome of public consultation directly – a call to refrain from clinical trials 
– to present Canadian xenotransplantation policies – a de facto moratorium – 
the public consultation scores well in terms of diffusion, brokerage, category 
formation and (de)certification.
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The impact of the TA by the Pontifical Academy for Life is assessed ambiguously. 
Insiders and outsiders of the Church differed in their assessment of the status 
of the document. Whereas the former qualified the document as not being 
definitive and as guidance only, the latter considered the status of the text as 
much more definitive and used it to legitimize xenotransplantation research.
Finally there is a group of cases in which TA had no impact on policy making 
whatsoever. In Italy the opinions of the National Bioethics Committee (CNB) 
and the National Committee on Biotechnology and Biosecurity (CNBB) were 
recommendations to the President of the Council of Ministers. Neither 
recommendation had any impact on law-making at the parliamentary level. The 
reasons for that were that: (1) clinical trials of xenotransplantation were stopped 
due to the self-imposed moratorium of xenotransplantation researchers, which 
was supported by many Italian researchers, (2) xenotransplantation regulations 
began to emerge in other countries and on international level, (3) the CNB does 
not have the power to impose its recommendations, (4) ethics is not a topic the 
Italian Parliament relishes tackling (Griessler et al. 2012b).
In Sweden the parliamentary committee submitted its report to the Minister 
of Social Affairs. Thereafter, the report was sent to select reviewing bodies in 
Sweden. That was as far as the TA got, because around the turn of the millennium, 
the political and media focus had shifted to stem cells. In addition, the moratorium 
had been in place for so long by the time the committee finished its report that 
most of the bigger research groups in Stockholm and Gothenburg had already 
split. Many of the researchers had moved on to other research fields or other 
tasks. The report remained with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and was 
not submitted to the Parliament as a bill (Hansson/Lundin 2011: 70).
In the UK the TAs had a high impact on national policies because their recommen-
dations became UK policy. In response to the Kennedy report’s recommendation, 
the UK Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA) was installed 
from 1997 to 2006 as a non-departmental expert advisory body which reported 
to the Secretary of State (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011: 26). UK TA exercises also 
had a tremendous impact on an international level because reports by the Nuf-
field Council and the Department of Health Kennedy Report as the first studies 
on the ethics of xenotransplantation were repeatedly used in other countries and 
international organisations as points of reference. UK policy initiatives also had 
an impact on the formation of EU xenotransplantation policy since it was among 
the first countries to develop a cautious yet permissive position, and members of 
UK policy initiatives became expert participants in international policy processes 
(Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011: 19).
The OECD does not possess strong generalized symbolic media to advance its 
policies. It is therefore bound to playing the ideas game to promote its policies. 
Together with the Council of Europe and the WHO, the OECD played an important 
role in putting xenotransplantation on the international agenda. It assembled key 
actors, provided an international platform, published documents, co-operated 
with the WHO to initiate international standards for surveillance and clinical 
practices, and finally moved the topic to the WHO.
However, there was also a group of cases in which TA had mixed or little Impact. 
The European Commission mainly used expert TA to get information and advice for 
its xenotransplantation policies. The impact of TA differed according to advisory 
body. The Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices 
(SCMPMD) raised xenotransplantation on its own initiative without connection to 
a legislative activity; consequently it only had limited impact on policy-making 
(Griessler et al. 2012a). In contrast, Borrás et al. (2007) consider the impact of the 
EMEA/EMA decisions in general to be substantial. The Commission’s decision on 
the use of non-human primates in research was made before the final opinion was 
adopted by the SCHER. However, the opinion was in line with the Commission’s 
general policy (Griessler et al. 2012a).
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Box 3: What explains impacts of (P)TAs?
As shown above, the CIT-PART project compiled a series of dense case studies, 
mapping a lot of the variations of the proper role of PTA in formal and complex 
terms, assessing how xenotransplantation was responded to in legal decision 
making. This is a problem in different settings. One ambition of the project 
was to explore what knowledge might be gleaned from a generalisation 
of these findings. This required, in the first instance, a systematic way of 
reducing some of the rich complexities of the material into some relatively 
concise indicators.
One approach to this included in the CIT-PART project consisted of applying 
a more formalised approach to analysing causal patterns in qualitative data, 
known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 2000). We used QCA 
as a first approach to explore if we could detect any generalisable patterns in 
the policy outcomes across 11 of our cases (for further details see Hansen/
Allansdottir 2011).
To make the question operational, we made a relatively crude distinction 
between ‘restrictive’ and ‘permissive’ policies, where ‘restrictive policies’ in 
most cases meant those where a formal or de-facto moratorium was imposed 
on clinical trials with xenotransplantation, whereas ‘permissive policies’ 
meant that research and innovation was actively encouraged (or in some 
cases that no policies were adopted at all, making it ‘permissive’ by definition). 
We looked at a series of factors including: 1) the presence or absence of PTA 
in the context, 2) the level of involvement of politicians, 3) the level of public 
attention to the issue, 4) the presence or absence of business interests in the 
context, and 5) the history of biotech regulation (i.e. whether any regulatory 
failures or scandals in other fields impacted on the discussions about 
xenotransplantation).
Our analysis showed that across 11 of our cases we could not establish any 
general links between the presence or absence of PTA events and the policy 
outcomes. PTAs were applied both in cases with a restrictive and a permissive 
outcome. Instead our data indicated that the combination of involvement 
of politicians and public attention and the absence of business interests 
correlated restrictive policies, whereas the inversion of those factors (absence 
of involvement by politicians, absence of public attention and presence of 
business interests) were correlated with permissive policies.
From these results it cannot be concluded that there are no effects of (P)TAs 
on policy making or specific policy outcomes, but only that those effects are 
likely to be more subtle and indirect than the relatively crude measures in 
our initial formalised exploration allowed us to examine. Hence, in the next 
step it was important to delve deeper into the individual cases and apply 
some more sensitive measures of impact, which also allowed us to analyse 
the more intermediate effects of such procedures and events.
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Our cases also show that the direct impact of TA on policy making is not a matter 
of course. It is dependent among other things: (1) the placement of the advisory 
body (internal, arm’s length, external); (2) it’s connection to policy-making 
(3); it’s reputation (unchallenged or contested); (4) it’s mandate (advisory or 
regulatory); and (5) the development of the issue to be regulated (in the case of 
xenotransplantation the science turned out be much more difficult and risky than 
previously assumed and stem cells appeared as alternative research field); and 
(6) the framing in political and broader public debate.
As we have observed, the public was engaged in the countries and organsiations 
under scrutiny in various ways. While only in three countries this involvement 
was organised in arrangements that may be formally labelled PTA, citizen and 
stakeholder engagement – though sometimes only in terms of information 
– was observable in many cases. Having observed in detail the level of public 
engagement, the question arises how to assess these developments and efforts 
in terms of democratic theory.
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In 1961 Robert Dahl published his study “Who Governs?” in which he empirically 
analysed the political structures of New Haven, a town in Connecticut, USA. The 
study serves as the empirical basis for his variant of pluralism, from then on the 
most influential example of pluralist democratic theories (also liberal democratic 
theory; compare with Goodwin 1997). Dahl developed his theory further over the 
following decades (Dahl 1998, 2003). He contends that a considerable number 
of groups take part and indeed make up US politics, with all of them getting (if 
not necessarily equal) access to policy-making. Thus, pluralist democratic theory, 
in contrast to elite democratic theories, advances that policy-making in liberal 
democracies is determined by a large number of groups, which effectively mirror 
the interests of society through the interplay of the different interest groups and 
organisations.
Pluralist democratic theory has been created to understand US politics and has 
been charged with being US-centric and indeed with idealising the political 
system of the USA (Goodwin 1997, Crouch 2004). Nevertheless it is the 
dominant account of modern democracies, providing a flexible framework for 
the understanding of contemporary democratic regimes (Laird 1993). Pluralist 
theories are linked with representative democracy, granting elected political 
representatives, who can look after the common good; a stabilising function for 
the political system (compare with Abels/Bora 2004).
Conceptions of direct democracy, in which citizens have a more direct access 
to decision-making through instruments such as, for instance, plebiscites and 
popular initiatives, are at the heart of participatory democratic theories, which 
came out of the new social movements of the 1960s and 70s (Goodwin 1997: 
299). David Held notes that the term “participatory democracy” was until the 
early 1990s the “leading counter-model” of the New Left to the notion of a legal 
democracy as forwarded by the New Right, which was based largely on the vision 
of Friedrich Hayek of a minimal state tightly controlled by a civil society through 
the means of legal instruments (Held 2006: 209). Proponents of participatory 
democratic theory criticise currently existing representative democracies for 
The questions at the focus of our attention in the following are:
• How democratic were the attempts to regulate xenotransplantation?
• How did PTAs fare in this respect in comparison with TAs?
• What explains the differences between the different cases regarding usage of 
instruments and approaches to democracy?
In order to answer these questions we must first turn to democratic theory in 
order then to build indicators for the evaluation of TAs and PTAs. Next we analyse 
the differences between the cases in a case-by-case comparison in order finally 
to reach an explanation of the variation between the cases.
Development of major strands of democratic theory
A number of models of democracy are relevant for evaluating the regulation of 
xenotransplantation (Biegelbauer et al. 2010). Some of these are more confined 
to theoretical thinking, whilst others are directly linked to empirical research.
In contrast to a large part of classic democratic theory with its often deeply 
philosophical reasoning, optimistic and also idealistic outlook on the world 
(e.g. John Locke, J.S. Mills) 20th century elite democratic theories are based 
less on normative idealisations, than on the discussion and indeed critique of 
actual politics. Max Weber is often seen as the forerunner of elitist democratic 
theory. He is pessimistic about the effects of the rise of large organisations and 
bureaucracies on political life and sees the role of democracy in curbing the 
excesses of the rising political system (Weber 1985). He affirms a trend of “elected 
dictatorship” in a “plebiscitarian leadership democracy”, equalising elections 
with plebiscites (Held 2006: 141). Joseph Schumpeter owes a lot of his ideas 
on democracy as formulated in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (1975, 
originatl 1942) to Weber and sees modern democracy as a set of institutional 
arrangements with the goal of generating leadership and producing legislative 
and executive decisions (Held 2006: 142).
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and Dennis Thompson argue that for a deliberative practice the concentration 
on the establishment of highly complex framework conditions and abstract sets 
of rules are less important than a concentration on more realistic, if non-ideal, 
situations (see Held 2006, 241). Their argument is that self-interested actors 
cannot be turned into altruistic persons, and that the most difficult real-world 
political problems to solve rest on what have been called intractable arguments 
(Pellizzoni 2003; Hansen 2005, 2006) or wicked problems (Roberts 2004). In 
these cases, conflicting interests are based on worldviews and rest on norms and 
values, which differ fundamentally and are therefore incommensurable. Conflicts 
on moral grounds might not be resolved, but mutually acceptable reasons should 
be sought before deciding on a course of action - and if that is not possible, 
a position of accommodation should be found that is consistent with mutual 
respect. A majority vote should only be taken when all discursive efforts have 
failed (Held 2006: 243). 
Leaving aside the differences between the various strands of the respective 
democratic theories, a number of important differences emerge by way of 
comparison of a pluralist/liberal representative and a participatory/deliberative 
direct democracy model. The most striking difference is that the most active role 
in the representative democracy model is that of the politician, whereas citizens 
have a more passive role - in the direct democracy model this dynamic reverses 
(see Table 8).
offering only very limited possibilities of participation to individuals, which 
ultimately leads to disappointed citizens in the increasingly depoliticised public. 
In order to counter this problematique a societal transformation is suggested, 
in which citizens should get more possibilities to participate in politics (Abels/
Bora 2004: 26). Democratic procedures, participatory democracy theorists insist, 
should not be restricted to politics in its more narrow and legal sense, but also 
extended to other key institutions of society, such as the workplace, and also 
decision-making at the local level, through which citizens can take control over 
the course of everyday life.
Representative democracy is also criticised by deliberative democratic theories, 
which originated in the 1980s and continue to raise interest. Instead of the 
width and the mechanics and institutionalisation of participation, deliberative 
democratic theories stress the importance of the quality of political debate. They 
attack one of the central tenets of pluralist democratic theory: that democratic 
politics are primarily an expression of private views and interests (Goodwin 1997: 
300). The focus of a deliberative democratic process then is on the way in which 
different political actors learn from each other's points of view and, through a 
process of considerate deliberation of the different positions, arrive at a better 
understanding of the problems at hand (Held 2006: 233). Many contributions 
to deliberative democracy are based on the work of Jürgen Habermas (Webler/
Tuler 2000, Held 2006, McLaverty/Halpin 2008) in which different modes of 
decision-making are discerned: on the one hand bargaining is associated with 
instrumental rationality, a logic in which actors try to defeat opposing views and 
to “win” an argument. On the other hand deliberation is based on communicative 
rationality, in which actors stay open-minded, try to listen to opposing views, 
and are ready to change their own standpoint. In order to have a meaningful 
deliberation an “ideal speech situation” has to be striven for, free of coercion and 
power relations (Hansen 2005).
These conditions have been deemed unrealistic, because power differentials, 
differing rhetorical abilities of discourse participants and other problems are likely 
to arise in an actual case of deliberation (Abels/Bora 2004: 29). Amy Gutmann 
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Building indicators for the evaluation of (P)TA from demo-
cratic theory
We would like to propose a set of indicators for the evaluation of TAs and PTAs, 
deduced from the very representative and direct democratic theorising presented 
above (Biegelbauer/Hansen 2011).
We explicate three central differences between the two models of democracy, 
which we often see articulated in discussion about how (P)TA processes ought to 
be organised to be ‘democratic’, as well as the kind of criticisms these standards 
may invoke. The differences relate to the following headlines: ‘Principles of 
inclusion’, 'Issue framing’ and 'Quality of decision-making’.
Principles of inclusion: In the representative tradition, an important aspect of 
democratic sovereignty pertains to the equality of citizens; the interests of all 
citizens should be given equal weight in decision-making processes. It is therefore 
essential that those passing judgement on behalf of the citizenry are representative 
of the larger public. This usually leads to demands that participants in such 
procedures must be statistically representative of the general population. From this 
perspective, criticism is due when processes are captured by minority interests.
In the direct democratic tradition, the ideal of sovereignty places more emphasis 
on the ideal of self-governance; the possibility for those affected by decision-
making to be able to take part in and influence decisions. The central criterion 
for public involvement is therefore whether all legitimate interests have been 
given the opportunity to articulate their concerns. In this perspective, criticism is 
due when particular voices are excluded, especially those of vulnerable, affected 
groups that may find it difficult to mobilise collectively.
Issue framing: In the representative tradition it is considered essential that the 
citizenry is enabled to make informed decisions. Therefore, it is important that 
participants in (P)TAs are provided with adequate and unbiased information. This 
can be achieved either through institutionally ‘independent’, or a plurality of 
information sources. Criticism is due if information is incomplete or prejudiced 
by actors serving their own interests.
Table 8: Comparison of Representative and Direct Democracy Models
Representative 
Democracy
Direct Democracy
Role of Politicians Provide authority Meet demands
Role of Citizens
Elect politicians
Support organisations to 
represent their interests
Articulate and develop 
own interests
Participate in all stages of 
the political process
Prime Legitimation
Indirect: politicians are 
elected by citizens
Direct: through citizen 
participation in different 
stages of the political 
process
Role of Civil Service
Effective and efficient 
professionals
Facilitators of collective 
decision making, 
co-learners
Role of Experts/Scientists
Producers of value free 
knowledge 
Offer cognitive support to 
particular causes
Support the (self-)
enlightenment of citizens 
by acting as co-learners
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Table 9: Two Democratic Traditions and Criteria for Assessing TA/PTAs
Representative ideals/
criteria for TA/PTA
Direct democratic ideals/
criteria for TA/PTA
Principle of inclusion
Equal weight to all citizens:
Are the participants 
representative of the 
citizenry in general?
Inclusion of all 
affected (groups):
Are all legitimate interests 
given a voice?
Issue framing 
Adequate information 
provision:
Is information provided by 
independent sources or a 
plurality of sources
Framing by the participants:
Are the included enabled to 
query the issues according 
to their own criteria of 
relevance
the political process
Quality of the 
decision-making 
process
Accountability of 
decision makers: 
Is it transparent how 
decisions are made 
and where complaints/
dissatisfaction can be 
registered?
Attention to arguments:
Is the process genuinely 
open-ended, and are 
decision makers willing to 
give reasons and engage in 
argumentative processes
process
Analysing the differences between the cases
The countries included in the CIT-PART-project arrived at xenotransplantation 
regulation in different ways. Whereas Austria had virtually no discussion 
on xenotransplantation, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Holy See, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the OECD and the EU all had various 
kinds of expert TAs; the UK engaged in TA studies which included invited 
participation of stakeholders, whereas Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
performed PTAs.
The direct democratic tradition stresses that 'information' cannot be provided 
out of context. Therefore, it is equally important that participants in deliberations 
are allowed and enabled to frame questions according to their own problem 
horizons, rather than simply act as recipients of authorised knowledge claims. 
Criticism is due when debates are cast in narrow, technocratic frames, excluding 
broader issues of social concern. 
Quality of decision-making: The representative tradition assumes that citizens 
have relatively stable, pre-defined interests. Politics is therefore an arena where 
different groups struggle to get their interests recognised. For this struggle to 
play out in a fair manner, it is essential that decisions are made in a transparent 
fashion and that decision-makers can be held accountable for their decisions. 
Criticism is due when it is not transparent on what basis decisions are made and 
who is held accountable (Rowe/Frewer 2000).
In the direct democratic tradition, interests and preferences are not considered 
pre-given, but rather they are shaped in deliberations. Therefore, the critical 
standard is not (only) whether the decision-making process is transparent and 
decision-makers can be held accountable, but whether decision-makers are 
genuinely open to arguments. Criticism is thus due when decisions are reached 
through bargaining and compromise in the absence of deliberative argumentation 
(Webler/Renn 1995).
The differences between the two traditions and the questions they generate for 
(P)TAs are outlined in Table 9 below.
While derived from theoretical models with different normative foci, the criteria 
need not be mutually exclusive in practice. However, the organisation of (P)TAs is 
likely to involve trade-offs on all three criteria. In order to examine this closer, we 
have classified and compared the CIT-PART data on xenotransplantation policy-
making according to the three pairs of criteria.
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committee at the Health Ministry said in a short statement that regulation of 
xenotransplantation might be necessary, no such steps were taken. This is rather 
typical of Austrian regulatory activities in science and technology governance: 
decisions often come late, if ever, and discussions are restricted to a narrow elite 
of civil servants and experts (Griessler 2010, 2012b).
 
In Table 10 we present a summary of the cases, ordered according to the criteria 
discussed above, of which we shall interpret selected aspects below.
For Austria there are no entries in the table because xenotransplantation was 
discussed exclusively in the civil service and with a few experts. Civil servants 
produced internal reports on OECD meetings they attended. Although a scientific 
Criteria from representative democratic theory Criteria from direct democratic theory
Equal weight to all 
citizens
Adequate 
information 
provision
Accountability of 
decision-makers
Inclusion of all 
affected (groups)
Framing by 
participants
Attention to 
arguments
AT AT
CA CA
CH CH
DK DK
EC EC
GB GB
IT IT
LV LV
NL NL
OECD OECD
SE SE
VA VA
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In general, xenotransplantation policies at a European level can be characterized 
as enabling. Xenotransplantation was not subject to a fierce public dispute and 
scrutiny at the EU level. The European Parliament did not debate the issue at 
any length. The European Council briefly discussed xenotransplantation in 
the context of the Clinical Trials Directive. Two scientific committees of the 
Commission, the SCMPMD and the SCHER, dealt with the issue in their opinions. 
In addition, the Commission funded xenotransplantation research and ELSA* 
projects in its successive Framework Programmes. The EMEA/EMA issued 
guidelines for xenogeneic cell-based products in the 2000s. Though the EC also 
funded research into ethical, legal and social aspects of xenotransplantation 
and participatory experiments therein, the public was almost entirely absent in 
advisory and decision-making processes leading to European policies, except for 
the SCHER’s public consultation and hearing on the use of non-human primates 
in research in 2008 (Griessler et al. 2012a).
In Italy two expert committees (National Bioethics Committee, National Committee 
for Biosecurity and Biotechnology) voiced opinions on xenotransplantation, which 
were not taken up by the government and from which no policy was adopted 
(Griessler et al. 2012b). Both opinions were initiated by the respective committee 
and framed by participants. These Committees did not give equal weight to all 
citizens because they only included appointed experts and civil servants. They 
did not provide adequate information, because the documents only became 
available online, in one case only after a lengthy delay. The accountability of 
these Committees was also found wanting because nomination in one case is 
inspired by politics, in the other based on nomination by various ministries. 
The committees included experts and civil servants and no representatives of 
affected groups. Finally there was no attention to the committees’ arguments, 
because: (1) neither expert body has any regulatory power; (2) politicians had 
little interest in the topic; and (3) the promises of xenotransplantation did not 
become a reality in the short term. Calls for a public debate from both Committees 
remained unaddressed.
By stark contrast, Canada featured public discussions, expert TA and PTA on 
xenotransplantation (see Figure 1, p. 53). The public consultation approach 
included a representative and open model. The latter included – beside a 
telephone survey a number of citizen forums in six Canadian regions. Adequate 
information was provided to the public in this public consultation by various 
means. Public consultation emphasized accountability of decision-makers and 
inclusion of affected groups. Participants of the citizen forums were able to 
change the framing of how xenotransplantation was perceived as a problem. 
The specific question posed to the PTA participants was rather narrow: Should 
Canada proceed to clinical trials? The citizen participants considered the issue of 
xenotransplantation to be much broader – an issue of health resources; animal 
welfare; ethics; alternatives to xenotransplantation, regulatory standards and 
regulatory preparedness. Finally in accordance with the opinion of the PTAs, 
Canada adopted a restrictive policy, however, it is not clear to which extent the 
PTA contributed to this decision (Einsiedel et al. 2011).
In Switzerland two expert TA (solid organ and cellular xenotransplantation) 
as well as a PTA on xenotransplantation were organized. In addition the two 
chambers of Parliament debated the issue thoroughly. Political decision-making 
and PTA were running in parallel and along similar lines to the Dutch case; the 
decision to regulate xenotransplantation came before the report of the PTA was 
published. However, the time lag was only a few days and, again similarly to the 
Dutch case, the opinions of politicians and PTA participants were congruent. In 
Switzerland xenotransplantation is permitted, if only with requirements and prior 
authorisation (Griessler 2011).
In Denmark a small party instigated a parliamentary debate on xenotransplantation. 
Soon a conference including international experts was held, followed by a 
parliamentary hearing, which led to a de facto moratorium on xenotransplantation 
(Hansen 2011). Since only experts and politicians were involved in decision, 
participants were not involved equally. Also not all affected groups were present 
because animal rights activists and patient groups decided on their own accord 
not to participate in a public discussion.
* ELSA = Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects
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In Sweden there were discussions in parliament on xenotransplantation. A 
parliamentary committee on xenotransplantation was established, which carried 
out a TA on the basis of expert hearings, an opinion survey and a subsequent 
conference, which was open to the public. Though the report took a permissive 
stance towards xenotransplantation its recommendations were never translated 
into law because of the risks of xenotransplantation and the voluntary moratorium 
of Swedish researchers on clinical trials. Thus, Sweden adopted an informal de 
facto moratorium on clinical trials (Hansson/Lundin 2011).
In keeping with UK policy approaches to science at this time, several expert TAs 
were carried out, as a result of which an agency (UKXIRA) was established with the 
aim of advising the health minister on matters relating to xenotransplantation. 
Subsequently, annual public meetings were organised in such a way that 
allowed members of the public to ask questions of the UKXIRA, but without 
any expectation that public views should inform UKXIRA policy; these exercises 
cannot therefore be considered PTAs. The table entries concentrate on the expert 
TAs. In the UK clinical trials of xenotransplantation are permitted in principle 
(Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011).There was not adequate information available in the 
UK on xenotransplantation, since it mainly derived from a company conducting 
xenotransplantation and the promissory claims they were making.
At the Holy See, the Pontifical Academy for Life was in principle positive and 
supportive towards xenotransplantation, so long as certain conditions were met. 
The Academy considers itself a scientific expert organisation. Therefore, only 
experts in science and ethics participated in the process. Participation was based 
on self-selection and appointment. Participation of the public is not part of the 
Academy’s self-perception. Thus, there was no public involvement. The public 
was informed about the document only later on in press releases, publications 
and online. Policy-makers were encouraged in the document to stimulate public 
discussion. The public was defined in the document as lay citizens, individual 
patients and relatives (Griessler et al. 2012b).
In Latvia a standardized form of application has to be submitted to the responsible 
government agency. Each case is reviewed by civil servants evaluating the safety 
and cost-effectiveness of the technology proposed. Since Latvia has no particular 
xenotransplantation regulation it also had no effect on government (Putnina/
Kaleja 2011). Apart from that no TA or PTA was carried out.
In the Netherlands parliamentary discussions took place, an expert TA, a PTA 
and public communication exercises were carried out. The decision of the 
responsible minister to stop xenotransplantation and of Parliament legally to ban 
xenotransplantation came before the PTA was concluded and the results were 
only relayed informally to the political system. Though procedurally problematic, 
there was a high level of correspondence between the PTA and the adopted 
policy. The Netherlands banned xenotransplantation (Versteeg/Loeber 2011). 
In this process adequate information was provided by various means, decision-
makers were accountable, and all affected groups were involved,
OECD activities were mainly triggered by the Member States (USA, the UK and 
Canada) and contributed to putting xenotransplantation on an international 
agenda. The OECD achieved this by providing a policy forum of mutual exchange 
with its workshops and reports (Griessler 2012a). Instead of a moratorium, 
the OECD favored harmonized international surveillance. It contributed to 
the formulation of elements of just such a global surveillance system. Finally, 
the OECD moved the agenda to the WHO. Whereas national governments’ 
representatives, the OECD staff, researchers and industry were strongly involved 
in OECD activities, only representatives from two patient groups and one 
NGO advocating animal welfare were present in the audience of a conference 
organized by the OECD. Thus, the OECD used a close and closed international 
network from national and international policy-making, research and industry to 
develop its policies. The public was only included via press conferences and the 
availability of the reports, which were published on paper and online. Though 
only recommendations, the output produced by the OECD was considered to 
have considerable impact on policy-making because it was developed in close 
collaboration between experts and representatives of national governments 
(Griessler 2012a).
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In our use of democratic theory we have decided to take a systemic view on 
deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2011), thus enabling us to see the “larger picture”, 
including the effects of TAs and PTAs not only on parliament or some specialised 
bureaucrats, but on the political system. With such a broad view of political 
processes we decided to relax some of the strict conditions often propagated 
in relation to deliberative democratic instruments, and so we were able to look 
differently at political actors such as campaigning animal-rights activists or 
lobbying industrialists. We interpreted these activities as being a legitimate part 
of the political process and not as a disturbance of idealised communicative 
exchanges. Similarly we took into account international, transnational and 
supranational discussions on xenotransplantation, which were influencing the 
debates on the national level.
In the following section we will look at the question of why public participation 
exercises seemed to take root more in some cases and less so in others.
Explaining the differences between the cases
As described above it seems to be difficult to make processes and results of 
participatory policy advice compatible with representative political systems 
(Biegelbauer/Hansen 2011). The problem has been identified already for 
some time (e.g. Joly/Assouline 2001, Joss/Belucci 2002, Bütschi et al 2004, 
Bora/Hausendorf 2004, Hansen 2010) . Yet the difficulties of creating some 
kind of “resonance” (Bütschi et al 2004) in the political systems of modern 
democracies persist. Our analysis shows that at least a part of this problem 
arises from differences in the normative foundations of PTA compared to existing 
representative institutions. This constitutes a dilemma for the proponents of 
PTAs: if such procedures are to deliver genuine alternatives to politics as usual, 
they need to distinguish themselves from other modes of policy advice. On the 
other hand, if they are too ‘alternative’, they risk being ignored. 
The question of whether representative democratic political systems are able to 
deal with the challenge of integrating participatory practices of policy-making is 
When comparing the results of the different cases one can see that Switzerland 
and Canada score best on both sets of criteria, whereas Austria, Italy and Latvia 
show the lowest scores. The other countries are lined up in between, with the 
Netherlands next, followed by Denmark, Sweden, the EC, the OECD, the UK, and 
finally the Holy See. The two sets of criteria are therefore not mutually exclusive, 
but rather seem to co-vary to a significant extent. This is perhaps not surprising, 
given that democracies have a systemic quality a fact reflected in democracy 
indices, where countries feature consistently high or low scores over most criteria 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, Campbell/Barth 2009). We also observe that the PTA cases 
scored better both on criteria drawn from representative and direct democratic 
theory than the TAs, and that the countries with a history of public engagement 
exercises, Switzerland, Canada, Netherlands and Denmark, in general had higher 
scores than those without.
Nevertheless it is important to notice that all of the PTA cases reviewed here 
produced, as already said, ambiguous results when it comes to the direct impact 
on policy-making in the sense of first generation of impact studies (see Chapter 
5). In Switzerland and in the Netherlands the delivery of PTA results were in a tight 
race with the parliamentary decision-making procedures that in the end was lost 
in both cases - which incidentally highlights an issue frequently raised against 
PTAs, namely that they are time-consuming (Abels/Bora 2004: 53; Montpetit 
2008). Moreover in both the Netherlands and Canada it is unclear how influential 
the PTA results were for actual xenotransplantation policy-making.
This observation provides two results:
• the question about the actual impact of PTAs on decision-making presents 
a methodological challenge to empirical analysis, especially when adhering 
to the demanding criterion derived from direct democratic theory, which 
call for the willingness of decision-makers to give reasons for and engage in 
argumentative processes with open results;
• the unclear results of PTAs on the regulation of xenotransplantation may also 
be interpreted as part of a series of rather disappointing results of public 
participation exercises in the governance of science and technology (Seifert 
2003, Abels/Bora 2004).
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Those countries have been more susceptible to the new public engagement 
instruments, in which different factors come together: 
• Of prime importance is a general openness of policy-making of the respective 
political system (compare also with Joly and Assouline 2001). 
• Equally important seems to be the absence of closely knit policy communities, 
as described by comparative political science for Austria and those of the British 
“administrative villages” before the Thatcherite “New Public Management” 
reforms kicked in (Peters/Pierre 2001). 
• Since many issues in the governance of science and technology do not 
necessarily involve politicians, but stay in the remit of the civil service, it is 
important that the bureaucracy is not paternalistic, but heeds accountability, 
transparency and openness as important factors in democratic decision-
making processes (as is the case for Canada).
• All of these factors make policy-making more permeable and more susceptible 
to new ideas. This susceptibility goes hand-in-hand with a pluralist political 
culture, in which public debates are led openly and indeed often intensely 
when it comes to value-laden intractable policy problems. Indeed the countries 
featuring PTAs on xenotransplantation, Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 
are all societies with a tendency of having open(ed) political debates. 
• In addition active mass media play an important role in creating public 
discussions, for example in the UK. 
• Finally there is also a recognizable “memory effect” as countries that have 
already carried out PTAs are more likely to have them again. In most of these 
cases the dominance of experts in the governance of science and technology 
is gradually reduced, thus further enhancing the chances of PTAs to become 
institutionalised.
still undecided. In principle representative democracies have shown that they can 
adapt to changes and over the last decades have reacted, amongst other things, 
to citizens disappointed by the welfare state, the strengthening of new forms of 
protest and participation influenced by social and technological developments, 
and the rise of non-governmental organisations. This has been described as 
a change from ”government to governance”, a path that comparative political 
science studies have shown that some countries have followed further than 
others (Rhodes 1997, Hajer/Wagenaar 2003, Sorensen/Torfing 2008).
In the regulation of science and technology we can observe that some countries 
have changed their ways of decision-making more than others. The historically 
contingent flexibility of political systems is important among the cases analysed 
in this paper. Austria, for instance, is traditionally a structurally conservative neo-
corporatist case with tightly coupled institutional structures allowing only for a 
limited input from outside the neo-corporatist policy communities in many policy 
fields. STS research indicates that in the governance of science and technology 
there has been an emphasis on experts and stakeholders in the country until the 
present day (Biegelbauer 2010). In the structurally less conservative Dutch case 
neo-corporatist institutions are relatively less privileged, merely some of the 
voices in the large chorus of societal interests trying to make themselves heard 
in policy-making (Karlhofer/Sickinger 2000). Scientific experts and stakeholders 
still hold a dominant position, but critically they have been supplemented by the 
public in the form of various public participation measures. In the structurally 
more dynamic case of the UK, decision-making on science and technology has a 
two-tier structure: on the one hand there has been a real proliferation of public 
engagement exercises of various sorts during the 2000s, making an effort to 
complement decision-making, while on the other hand the older forms of policy-
making processes in which experts play the key role still are dominant, if perhaps 
somewhat less visible (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011). 
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Table 11: Significant Actors in Agenda Setting
Civil servants Politicians NGOs
Advisory or 
TA Body
Researchers
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Most often, it was civil service that became active in raising xenotransplantation as 
a policy issue. In many cases, public administration played a crucial role in agenda 
setting: In Austria, civil servants raised the topic because of their involvement in 
OECD activities (Griessler 2012b). Similarly, Latvian xenotransplantation policies 
were controlled by civil servants (Putnina/Kaleja 2011). Also in Canada public 
administration took initiative in xenotransplantation policies because it became 
aware that it was ill prepared for potential applications for clinical trials (Einsiedel 
et al. 2011). The process of agenda setting was supported by the minister. In 
the UK, both the Department of Health as well as the independent Nuffield 
Council were prime movers in xenotransplantation policies (Brown and Beynon-
Jones 2011). Civil service also managed agenda setting at the OECD level. 
Let us now return to the micro-level of our cases and address the question 
how civil servants, politicians and experts actually did cope with the complex 
problem of xenotransplantation. Which political practices of involving experts 
and the public did they use? In what way were they contributing to or limiting 
citizen participation? To address these questions several political practices are 
investigated: agenda setting; setting up a committee and working processes 
within the committee.
Agenda Setting
The ability and legitimacy of actors to set and frame a political agenda is critical 
for exerting influence on any policy field. Whether actors – may they be elected 
politicians, civil servants, experts, stakeholders, NGOs, media, or the public –
are implicitly or explicitly legitimatized and able to raise and define an issue 
as a policy problem that would need analysis, debate or regulation is of utmost 
importance for the direction and outcome of a debate.
However, it is not only important to know which actors in a particular society 
or organisation are entitled to raise an issue, but also the specific political 
practices how this is done. An important question within the CIT-PART project is 
whether such practices work towards inclusion of the public or tend to exclude 
people. Table 11 provides an overview on the actors that set the agenda in 
xenotransplantation policies. It shows that different actors became primarily 
active in agenda setting.
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In several cases it was an independent advisory body that was particularly active 
in agenda setting. At the European Commission several departments – so called 
Directorate General (DG) – and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) became 
active in xenotransplantation policies. Different DGs had different reasons for 
dealing with xenotransplantation, including the risk for infection and epidemics, 
the use on non-human primates in research, and the promise to boost European 
economy. In some DGs it were civil servants themselves, in others members 
of scientific committees (Griessler et al 2012: 10) or working parties (ibid. 
26) who put xenotransplantation on the agenda. In Italy, both the National 
Bioethics Committee (CNB) as well as the National Committee for Biosecurity 
and Biotechnology (CNBB) produced recommendations on their own initiative 
(Griessler et al. 2012b: 17, 19). In Switzerland, TA-Swiss took the initiative for a TA 
and PTA study because of international research and regulatory activities as well 
as an incipient public debate (Griessler 2011: 32).
In the Swedish case xenotransplantation researchers themselves played a critical 
role in putting the issue on the political agenda: They contacted the Ministry of 
Health and requested an inquiry into necessary regulatory measures to carry out 
xenotransplantation research (Hanson/Lundin 2011).
Only in Switzerland NGOs were critical in putting xenotransplantation on the 
political agenda.
Openness of Agenda Setting
An important characteristic of agenda setting is its openness or closeness to the 
public, i.e. the extent to which the general public is able to influence agenda 
setting. Table 12 shows that in most cases agenda setting was closed to the public.
This can be explained by the OECD’s function as international political and expert 
organisation which almost entirely is comprised of national and international civil 
servants as well as experts. Several member states were interested in putting 
xenotransplantation on the international agenda. Civil service also initiated the 
xenotransplantation debate within the Vatican. After several inquiries from local 
bishops for guidance on the issue, the Curia, the highest level of the Catholic 
Church’s administration, asked the Pontifical Academy for Life, an expert body of 
natural scientists, physicians, theologians, lawyers and bioethicists, to provide an 
opinion on xenotransplantation (Griessler et al. 2012b).
Elected politicians were considerably less active in agenda setting than their 
administrative staff. Cases in which politicians were crucial in agenda setting 
include Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands. In Switzerland, the work 
of one MP was critical for putting xenotransplantation on the agenda, but it 
was a number of other actors as well – a NGO critical of biotechnology and a 
parliamentary TA organisation – who contributed to initiating a discussion about 
xenotransplantation as a policy problem (Griessler 2011). In the Netherland 
too, it was a number of actors – elected politicians among them – who became 
critical in initiating a debate. The Health Council, an expert advisory body 
to government, was the first that raised attention for the topic, and advised 
the Ministry of Health, after its request for counselling, to take a permissive 
policy. Thereupon it was the Minister of Health – with the usual support of the 
department’s civil service – who took a lead in setting the agenda, commissioning 
advice on the topic and, eventually, taking into account various forms of advice 
(including legal advice from the state’s main juridical advisory board), issued a 
change of the respective law and formalised a de facto ban on research in the 
field of xenotransplantation. During this process, members of parliament called 
for a PTA (Versteeg/Loeber 2011). In Denmark, TA organisations raised the topic, 
because of possible public concern about xenotransplantation and because they 
considered it an appropriate topic for inter-institutional cooperation between 
TA organisations which was demanded by politicians (Hansen 2011: 22). After a 
hearing on the issue at Copenhagen University, organised by TA organisations, a 
small conservative party instigated a debate in parliament (Hansen 2011).
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xenotransplantation as a topic for discussion and regulation (Griessler et al. 
2012a). In Latvia, the public was not involved in discussing xenotransplantation at 
all (Putnina/Kaleja 2011: 19). The process of agenda setting was basically closed 
to the public in the UK as well, though invited stakeholders had an opportunity to 
send in written responses. However, members of the expert advisory group and 
their secretariat had a strong “gate-keeper position”, because they determined 
the format of possible responses and were “free to interpret the relevance 
of the submissions which they received” (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2012: 31). 
The UKXIRA also held annual open meetings, where members of the public were 
invited to respond and contribute to discussions concerning the regulation of 
xenotransplantation (ibid.). In Sweden, agenda setting was limited to experts, 
civil service and politicians and excluded the public (Hansson/Lundin 2011: 48). 
NGOs such as animal welfare activists were denied the opportunity to participate 
in the parliamentary xenotransplantation commission to the extent they would 
have liked (ibid. 61 and 89 ff.).
The case was remarkably different in the Netherlands: Though agenda setting 
was closed to the public as well, the actors who initiated the debate called from 
the very beginning for public involvement in terms of information and discussion.
In contrast to most of the cases, the Canadian health ministry opted for opening 
up the policy-making process and including other actors and the public in 
a complex process of stakeholder and public involvement. The ministry put 
xenotransplantation on the agenda with the explicit goal to consult with the public. 
Attempts were made to open the debate and to include stakeholders, national and 
international experts as well as the public (Einsiedel et al. 2011). In Switzerland, 
several mechanisms of direct and representative democracy were used to initiate 
a debate. NGOs collected signatures for their cause and – via their connection with 
a MP – were able to use established mechanisms of parliamentary democracy such 
as interpellations and motions to make parliament and government aware of the 
problem. This contributed to the issue being taken up by Parliament and TA Swiss 
(Griessler 2011).
Table 12: Agenda Setting – Openness to the Public
Open Closed
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
In Austria, the process of agenda setting was controlled by civil service and 
the discussion was almost entirely kept within the ministry (Griessler 2012b). 
Also in Denmark the debate remained an “elitist undertaking restricted to some 
rather narrow – and to some extent – closely intertwined expert circles” (Hansen 
2011: 32). This is also true for Italy and the Vatican, where agenda setting was 
controlled by expert committees. At the OECD, agenda setting was completely 
shut off from the public and remained in the realm of experts as well as national 
and international civil servants. At the European level, the public was neither 
involved at the European Commission nor at the EMA in the process of selecting 
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Table 13: Openness and Accountability in Recruitment
Open call for tender
Explicit selection 
criteria
Declaration of 
conflict of interests
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Most often, recruitment processes were characterized by little openness and 
accountability.
In Austria, no formal TA process was initiated and the civil servants who dealt 
with xenotransplantation were appointed by the ministry. Likewise, there were no 
attempts in Latvia to carry out a TA or PTA process on xenotransplantation (Putnina/
Kaleja 2011: 30). Typically, decision-making with expert involvement tends to 
happen in Latvia “behind closed doors” (ibid.). Expert TA is “institutionalized as 
a routine case-to-case decision making procedure within governmental agency” 
(ibid. 27). Generally, “the composition of the committee is closed and its members 
are often chosen on a basis of acquaintanceship” (ibid.).
Creating a Committee
Once it is accepted that an issue is a problem to be attended, it has be decided 
who actually is going to analyse it and will work out recommendations. A resulting 
question is: How to create expert committees and to recruit its members? In the 
context of the CIT-PART project an important question concerns the openness 
and accountability of expert committees. Openness and accountability starts, 
with the way committee members are selected: Is their appointment solely based 
on scientific qualification or are other reasons important as well, such as political 
affiliation? Does a published set of selection criteria exist or are nominations 
only based on undisclosed, implicit criteria? Are members appointed after an 
open call for tender or is it a self-selecting process, based, e.g., on personal 
acquaintance? Do committee members have vested interests, which are never 
announced or are they obliged to provide a declaration of conflict of interests?
Openness of Recruitment
Table 13 shows whether recruitment for expert TA and PTA was open or not and 
whether it was based on explicit selection criteria. In addition it provides an 
overview whether declarations of conflict of interests were required or not.
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fairly free hand to choose committee members in a process of self-selection. 
Implicit selection criteria included not only scientific qualification but to a great 
extent also political considerations. For instance, the political parties present 
in the committee, which nominated their representatives, had to represent 
parliamentary majority. Experts were selected from a rather small circle, “since 
Sweden is a relatively small country [and] many of the members knew each other 
and worked together in other areas” (Hansson/Lundin: 53).
The recruitment process at the Vatican was self-selecting as well and of little 
openness. Members of the working group were chosen on basis of previous 
acquaintance as well as on recommendation of an Italian xenotransplantation 
researcher (Griessler et al. 2012b: 34).
In the UK, the Department of Health’s committee was set up by a single civil 
servant, “who would research the field, determine who the relevant experts were, 
and (with agreement from relevant superiors) recruit them” (Brown/Beynon-
Jones 2012: 50). Though recruitment practices since then changed towards more 
transparency, they were rather opaque in the mid-1990s.
In Canada, a number of committees were created which subsequently dealt with 
expert TA and PTA in the field of xenotransplantation (c.f. Einsiedel et al. 2011). 
Focusing this assessment on recruitment processes carried out by the citizen 
forums of six provinces, PTA exercises were organised rather openly. They were 
based on voluntary application after random mailing of 2.500 invitations in 
each of the six regions. Participants were selected by a committee considering 
“gender, age, mother tongue, urban/rural location, occupation” (ibid. 27).
Also in Switzerland a number of bodies had to be considered when analyzing 
recruitment processes of TA and PTA bodies. The contractor who performed 
the TA studies on solid organ xenotransplantation was selected after an open 
and international call for tender. Appointment of the members of the advisory 
committee who accompanied the expert TA as well as the PTA process was based 
on their expertise and on the fact that they represented important stakeholders. 
Danish TA organizations arranged a number of small- and medium scale TA 
activities which included hearings at Copenhagen University and the Danish 
Parliament as well as a report by the Gene-Technology-Commission. In none of 
these exercises, explicit recruitment criteria were made public (Hansen 2011).
Recruitment processes were also closed and little accountable in Italy. The CNB’s 
mandate covers broad advice to government, parliament and other institutions on 
ethical and moral issues in the area of biomedicine and life science. Appointment 
of its roughly 40 external experts depends not solely on qualification but also 
has a “fairly strong political component” (Griessler et al. 2012b: 18). Another 
expert advisory body, the CNBB, advises government in technical matters 
concerning new biotechnology and consists of delegates from ministries as well 
as of institutions which deal with research and health.
Members of the Dutch Health Council, which performed expert TA in the 
Netherlands, are often recruited from a limited circle of researchers in the 
field. Further criticism regarding recruitment concerns two contributors to 
the xenotransplantation report who faced a conflict of interest, since they 
had links with pharmaceutical industry which also carried out research in 
xenotransplantation (Versteeg/Loeber 2011: 30). Thus, recruitment processes for 
expert TA were little open and accountable. As regards Dutch PTA, the approach 
towards public engagement included inter alia larger national and smaller public 
discussions with “as diverse a part of society as possible”. This included “public 
organizations, interest organizations and professional organizations, experts, 
politicians, and policy makers. Individuals could participate via website, local 
debates and survey; youths were approached via the schools” (Versteeg/Loeber 
2011: 41). How institutions for PTA were selected remained unclear.
Also the OECD’s nomination processes for national experts and representatives 
was and still is little open and accountable. Both are nominated by member states.
In Sweden, the Health Ministry first appointed a MP as chairperson of the 
parliamentary Xenotransplantation Committee. The chairperson was given a 
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Table 14 Level of Interdisciplinarity in TA and PTA
Weak 
interdisciplinarity
Strong 
interdisciplinarity
Transdisciplinarity
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Table 14 shows that TA processes in two cases were characterised by weak 
interdisciplinarity and involved solely natural scientists (AT, EC). In another 
group of cases expert TA can be categorised as strongly interdisciplinary only 
(IT, VA). Most cases, however, were marked by a combination of strong inter- and 
transdisciplinarity, the latter either by involving politicians or the general public. 
Both Canadian and Swiss TA and PTA processes had elements of strong inter- and 
transdisciplinarity. In Denmark, TA bodies varied as regards interdisciplinarity. A 
one-day seminar at Copenhagen University included only scientists working in 
the field (Hansen 2011: 41). The parliamentary hearing included MPs, scientists, 
Lay participants of the PTA (PubliForum) were selected from a group of about 100 
people who had volunteered to participate by responding to an invitation which 
had been send out to about 10.000 randomly selected Swiss residents. Selection 
of participants took in account gender and regional representation (Griessler 
2011: 37).
At European Commission level, two scientific committees advising the 
Commission dealt with xenotransplantation, the Scientific Committee on 
Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (SCMPMD) and the Scientific Committee 
on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER). The Commission’s advisory system 
had been reorganized in the mid-1990s following a severe political crisis in 
order to reestablish public trust in EU regulation. In order to reach this goal, 
recruitment procedures should meet the principles of excellence, independence 
and transparency (Griessler et al. 2012a: 7). They therefore include elements 
such as open calls for expression of interests in which researchers can apply 
for membership, the publication of selection criteria and of the names of 
selected members as well as declaration of conflicts of interest (ibid.: 8). Besides 
ordinary members, scientific committees also comprised of external experts, who 
contributed to the work on xenotransplantation. In contrast to ordinary members, 
they were appointed in a self-selecting process, identified either from committee 
members’ own scientific network, from a pool of experts within the Commission 
or from literature review.
Interdisciplinarity
Xenotransplantation is a topic which not only includes different research 
disciplines in the natural sciences but also raises ethical and societal questions. 
To which extent does the composition of TA and PTA processes recognize 
the consequent need for collaboration between natural scientists (weak 
interdisciplinarity), natural and social scientists as well as ethicists (strong 
interdisciplinarity) and between researchers and other societal actors?
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Table 15: Accountability of Working Processes
Agenda Records Reports
Public attendance 
of meetings
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Table 15 shows that most countries and organisations provided information in 
terms of publishing reports on the Internet. Only in a few cases the public had 
an opportunity to attend meetings of TA and PTA processes (CA, CH, GB, and 
NL). A remarkable exception to the often practiced principle of confidentiality 
of meetings was the British UKXIRA, which held annual public meetings. The 
European Commission together with Canada scored amongst the best regarding 
openness of the working process. Scientific Committees of the Commission 
have to publish agendas, minutes and opinions (including minority opinions), 
without undue delay, taking into account the need for commercial confidentiality 
(Griessler et al. 2012a: 9). However, there is still room for improvement. 
ethicists, economists. The Gene-technology Commission was comprised of 
scientists, ethicists, staff of a TA organisation and civil servants (ibid. 42). In 
Britain, the committees that produced the Nuffield Council and the Department 
of Health’s report were marked by strong interdisciplinarity; however, both also 
had an element of transdisciplinarity because they invited stakeholders for 
comments. In the Netherlands, the Health Council can be characterized as a 
strongly interdisciplinary committee, comprising of medical doctors, researchers, 
but also of jurists and ethicists (Versteeg/Loeber 2011: 31). The Dutch PTA 
exercises commissioned by the Ministry of Health on the other hand can be 
considered transdisciplinary. The OECD involved mainly natural scientists who 
dominated the discussion, but conferences were also attended by a small number 
of ethicists and an even smaller number of NGO representatives (Griessler 
2012a). Finally, the OECD also involved the civil servants who could consider its 
recommendations. The parliamentary Swedish Xenotransplantation Committee 
was transdisciplinary and included MPs, a researcher, a physician and an ethicist, 
a civil servant from the Health Ministry and the Swedish Institute for Infectious 
Disease Control.
Working Process
Another aspect of openness and accountability concerns the quality and amount 
of information which is available to the public about a committee’s proceedings. 
This concerns the publication of agendas and records of meetings, reports or 
even the possibility to attend meetings.
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Table 16: Type of Working Processes
Hearing/
Conference
Paper discussed 
in the committee
Specific method 
applied
Facilitation
AT
CA
CH
DK
EC
GB
IT
LV
NL
OECD
SE
VA
Most often papers – or parts of them – were drafted by single committee members 
and then discussed in meetings with the group. Often, hearings and conferences 
were used to collect necessary information and discuss xenotransplantation 
policies. In three cases particular methods for PTA and TA were chosen. In 
Canada and Switzerland the Danish consensus conference model was applied. 
The working group of the Pontifical Academy for Life followed the bioethics 
textbook of its chairman and produced its paper during one year in a series of 
interdisciplinary seminars which first considered scientific aspects and problems, 
thereafter discussed anthropological aspects and finally drew ethical conclusions 
(Griessler et al. 2012b: 37). Facilitators were present in PTA exercises (CA, CH and 
NL) but also in expert hearings in Denmark.
Transparency was considerably curtailed by the fact that the minutes were 
often rather brief and only comprised of a participant list, an agenda and a short 
summary. Information about proceedings of the scientific commissions and 
working groups was not provided (Griessler et al. 2012: 9). In addition, public 
participation in the Commission’s scientific committees was severely restricted 
by strict framing by sound science and confidentiality (Griessler et al. 2012a: 
37). The Canadian Public advisory group formulated principles of transparency: 
“the public involvement plan would strive to respect the following principles: 
a visible/transparent process, credibility (includes honesty and willingness to 
discuss hard issues), equal opportunity for all to participate, each participant will 
be considered as contributing valuable input, willingness of Health Canada to 
seriously consider all the input from the public involvement process” (Einsiedel 
et al. 2011: 22).
Types of Working Processes
Once an agenda is set, a committee furnished, and it is decided how open and 
accountable a committee should be towards the public, there has to be defined 
how the committee will actually arrive at its recommendations. Is the method 
used made explicit or does it remain implicit? Is the report a single-authored 
paper or is it discussed in depth and approved by the committee? Is a moderator 
present who manages the process?
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Conclusions
In order to increase the chances of PTA being applied, it is particularly important 
to understand the role of civil servants and experts in decision-making in science 
and technology policy. In many cases, civil servants played the most eminent role 
in agenda setting. Also researchers, either in advisory bodies or as individuals, 
were critical in putting xenotransplantation on the agenda. In contrast – despite 
the fact that xenotransplantation might be a highly sensitive area – activities of 
elected politicians were less frequent. Only in one case NGOs were critical in 
agenda setting.
Agenda setting repeatedly was a process closed to the public. Moreover, it was 
often a little formalized process. In many cases it was not clear from hindsight 
how xenotransplantation actually became a policy issue. This lack of formalization 
makes it rather difficult for outsiders to set a topic on the political agenda.
Openness and accountability of recruitment are necessary elements to create 
trust in regulation. However, recruitment processes were often closed and 
based on nomination (relying on acquaintance, self-selection) with criteria that 
remained opaque and implicit. Only in a few instances declarations of conflicts 
of interests were provided.
Xenotransplantation as a research field necessitates strong interdisciplinarity 
and transdisciplinarity. This need was in principle recognized in many cases, 
though actual public involvement was infrequent. Methods applied in working 
processes often remained implicit.
Openness and accountability also requires information. Most often reports 
were made available on the Internet. Publication of agendas and records was 
considerably less frequent and public attendance of meetings was only possible 
in a few exceptional cases and in cases which included PTA exercises.
Box 4: Gender Aspects
The CIT-PART project looked into some gender aspects of xenotransplantation 
policies as well as TA and PTA. In most cases, gender was not an issue in the 
debate and the topic was hardly addressed. The few exceptions were a Dutch 
animal welfare organisation and a Swedish Green Party who claimed that 
xenotransplantation was an approach connected with low representation 
of women in medical sciences (Versteeg/Loeber 2011: 66) or an exploitive 
relationship towards nature, respectively (Hansson/Lundin 2011: 96). Surveys 
conducted in Italy and Canada showed minor differences between men and 
women regarding their attitude towards xenotransplantation. According to 
these studies, men were more likely to approve of this medical approach than 
women (Einsiedel et al. 2011: 19, Griessler et al 2012b: 17).
With the exception of the Swedish Xenotransplantation Commission (Hansson/
Lundin 2011: 96) and a Danish Genetechnology Commission (Hansen 2011: 
43), there was a clear male bias in terms of scientists participating in many 
expert committees. This was not the case in PTA exercises. In Canada, 56 of 107 
lay panellists in PTA were women (Einsiedel et al. 2011. 27). In Switzerland, 
the number of male and female participants in the PubliForum was equal 
(14/14). A professional moderator was responsible for ensuring that women 
and men had an equal opportunity to contribute to the discussions. In the 
advisory group there was a slight male majority of 8 men to 6 women and 
the invited experts who informed the lay panel about xenotransplantation 
included two women and one man (Griessler 2011). In the Netherlands, a 
relatively large number of women participated in the public discussion 
(Versteeg/Loeber 2011: 66).
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variation in policy response that we found in our cases we conclude that context-
specific national and historic factors to a large extent co-determine the choice 
for including a (P)TA arrangement in the policy preparation process. Culture plays 
a significant role in science and technology policy-making. The CIT-PART project 
thus empirically underscored the contention of Science and Technology Studies 
literature that a problem is not ‘given’ but is contingent on the way an issue is 
perceived in a certain setting, and is subject to particular framings. Framings cum 
circumstances can either provoke discussions or not, and can render some issue 
controversial or not. We found that the ways xenotransplantation was perceived 
and treated depended significantly on the way it was framed, and on previous 
experiences in a country. In Canada for instance the issue was considered 
potentially socially explosive, another potential test of the trustworthiness of 
a government that had recently been hit by a scandal over HIV-infected blood, 
while in Austria xenotransplantation was not identified as a policy problem at all.
The xenotransplantation issue was framed in various ways. Whereas organ 
shortage and risks – mainly of cross-species infection – were dominant frames 
in almost all of our cases, ethics and animal welfare were only important in a 
minority of them. In some cases, business interests provided an important framing. 
International organisations in particular, which influenced xenotransplantation 
policy development significantly, dealt with xenotransplantation mostly within a 
strict framing of sound science, evading – though recognizing – ethical, social and 
political implications. Only a minority of cases, among them Canada, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the Vatican discussed the ethics of 
xenotransplantation thoroughly.
In other words, we observe that framing was a decisive, basically contingent 
factor. The way the issue was framed in a nation or organisation was highly 
dependent on a country’s or international organisation’s previous experiences 
and history, and, in the case of international organisation, its mandate.
Advocates of Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA) claim that this approach 
to public engagement could improve the quality of decision-making in science 
and technology policy, enhance citizen involvement in complex policy issues and 
increase the public acceptance of decisions made. Yet, more often than not, even 
in cases of technically and ethically highly complex issues, policy-makers do not 
opt for such a form of public engagement. Instead, policy-makers make use of 
expert-led Technology Assessments, or refrain from commissioning any specific 
technology-oriented policy analysis at all. The question is why? To what extent is 
PTA or TA applied? What explains the choices made, what are the experiences of 
using either, and what is their impact on policy-making?
Extensive research on PTA has provided a comprehensive overview of PTA 
methods and the use and impact of PTA. However, characteristically, such research 
compares cases in which different PTA methodologies are used to investigate 
different technologies. In addition, TA is seldom included in such studies and 
there are hardly any studies analysing how PTA processes are incorporated into 
policy-making.
The CIT-PART project addressed these research gaps. Comparing different 
countries and international organisations, it focused on how one particular 
policy problem, the issue of xenotransplantation, was approached. Centre stage 
were the PTA or TA procedures that were initiated to support policy-making 
processes. Thus the CIT-PART project was set to find out what factors facilitated 
and restricted the use of, and impact of citizen participation on decision-making.
Xenotransplantation as a policy issue
A first, striking, observation was the sheer variety of ways in which the cases 
under investigation dealt with xenotransplantation. While in principle the issue 
could be addressed uniformly in all cases given its technological aspects, the 
risks involved and its potential benefits, huge differences were observable in how 
the issue was approached between countries, and how it was regulated. From the 
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Netherlands and Switzerland). The reasons why PTA was set up in these three 
countries varied, as did the way it was organised.
As concerns the reasons why some countries opted for a PTA: The federal 
department Health Canada decided for a broad consultation strategy which 
included expert TA and public consultation. This decision was made for 
various reasons: a) there was uncertainty about the promises and risks of 
xenotransplantation, b) it was assumed that applications for clinical trials were 
imminent, which Health Canada was legally bound to address within a short 
period of time, and c) there were concerns over a previous scandal (see above) 
which had undermined the government’s regulatory credibility. The Dutch case 
revealed a different set of reasons. In the Netherlands, the responsible minister, 
while herself initially in favour of a permissive policy on xenotransplantation, 
answered demands for a public debate by Parliament with an initiative for public 
consultation. A PTA was then organised to stimulate debate but also notably to 
inform the public on the issue of xenotransplantation; a new episode in what 
was seemingly becoming a tradition of broad societal debates on life-science 
issues in the Netherlands. In Switzerland, it was TA-Swiss, a TA organisation 
then linked to Swiss Parliament that initiated a PTA. Reasons for doing so 
included the international developments, namely forecasts that clinical trials in 
xenotransplantation would be imminent and promised a huge economic market, 
and because a NGO criticising xenotransplantation triggered a public discussion 
on the topic in this country which had already reached Parliament.
In addition to these three instances of PTA in policy-making on the issue of 
xenotransplantation, there were a variety of Technology Assessment exercises 
that sat on a sliding scale between ‘full-blown’ formal public engagement and 
mere expert advice. In the UK, TA exercises were expert-led but also involved 
invited stakeholder discussions. Furthermore, in Canada, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland the PTAs were staged alongside expert TAs of various kinds. 
Academics in some other countries and at EC level took initiatives to experiment 
with PTA on xenotransplantation, yet did not link these efforts to policy-making.
Xenotransplantation regulation
Not just the framing of xenotransplantation and the intensity of (public) 
discussions differed between countries. A second observation was that the way 
the topic was translated in public policy and regulation varied (Tallacchini 2011). 
Our international comparison showed a diversity of xenotransplantation policies. 
Most countries and international organisations decided upon permissive policies, 
but in a minority of cases countries opted for a de facto or de jure moratorium. 
One country, Austria, took a ‘wait-and-see’ position.
Technology Assessment on xenotransplantation
A third observation concerns the forms of policy analysis used to channel 
(societal and expert) discussions to inform the policy decisions made. Expert 
TA turned out to be the dominant way to deal with xenotransplantation. Most 
countries and international organisations, which were influential in international 
xenotransplantation policy development, applied expert TA only. This group 
included the OECD, Sweden, the Vatican and the EC scientific advisory system. 
International organisations played an important role in the dissemination of 
technical information on xenotransplantation. Networking by and through 
international institutions such as the Council of Europe, the WHO, the OECD and 
at an EU level provided civil servants with knowledge on the issue. An interesting 
observation we identified was that in most policy efforts of international 
organisations, experts who advocated xenotransplantation were dominant, 
whereas positions opposing xenotransplantation were weakly represented. 
We found that this potentially created a dangerous in-group thinking effect, 
especially since the same studies and reports were used as authoritative sources 
of information in policy processes throughout Europe. Dissenting views were 
thus already put in a disadvantaged position at the very onset of policy dialogues 
and public debates on the topic.
The staging of PTA remained a minority in xenotransplantation policy-making. 
Only three countries in our large sample carried out a PTA (Canada, the 
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Only in a minority of cases politicians, i.e. members of parliament and ministers, 
got involved in xenotransplantation policies (Canada, Denmark, Netherland, 
Sweden, and Switzerland).
NGOs were involved in some TA and PTA exercises (UK, Canada, Switzerland, and 
Netherlands), however, in many cases they did not participate, either because 
they were excluded or they themselves decided not to engage in the debate.
Although many TA documents demanded public debate, actual and direct 
citizen involvement was an exception. As has been said, only in Canada, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland were citizens strongly involved in PTA exercises. 
Thus, xenotransplantation policies remained primarily the domain of policy-
makers and experts.
Of the many ways in which the public may be involved in policy development, 
polling can be seen as the most passive. This was most often used. In addition, 
in most countries, though with different intensity, the public was informed about 
xenotransplantation. As already mentioned, public consultation and discussion, 
which gives citizens the most active role, was only carried out in a minority of 
countries.
Incorporation of (P)TA in the policy process: impact
A fifth observation concerns the way in which TAs and PTAs were included in 
processes of xenotransplantation regulation, and the extent to which they 
impacted on these. We found that, in general, open political systems were more 
likely to integrate public engagement exercises such as PTAs. Yet it is not enough 
simply to suggest institutionalising public engagement exercises as a suitable 
way forward. Our findings show that the mere fact that such exercises were 
carried out did not mean that they had a clear effect on the regulation of the new 
technology. This was the case in all three countries in which a PTA was staged. 
Though policy-makers in all the cases in which PTA was carried out approved of 
the PTA and its results, we could not to establish an unambiguous direct impact 
Actor group involvement: the ‘social map’ of xeno-debate
In keeping with the framing of the issue and the intensity of the debate, varied 
the range of actors that got involved in discussions on xenotransplantation and 
its regulation. In most cases, civil servants interacted not only with researchers, 
physicians and other experts, but also with patient organisations, animal welfare 
organisations, ethicists and the lay public at large so as to inform political 
judgement and decision-making.
Yet the group of actors that was most intensely involved in the preparation of 
policy on xenotransplantation in almost all cases was the civil service. They 
served as a bridge between engaged politicians, knowledge providers, and in 
those cases where there was a PTA initiated. Another actor group heavily involved 
were scientists and physicians. They operated in multiple roles, acting not only 
as neutral experts, but also as spokespersons for patients and representatives of 
their own and the industry’s interest (see also Gottweis 1998). Together with civil 
servants they formed the core of an international epistemic community, which 
met on repeating occasions to discuss the regulation of xenotransplantation in 
different forums such as the Council of Europe, the OECD, and the WHO but also 
on national level. The strong involvement of the two groups and the formation 
of an epistemic community that started to share policy ideas contributed to a 
dominant technocratic framing in discussions on xenotransplantation policies.
In contrast to civil servants and scientists, ethicists were less strongly involved 
in TA, with the exception of Canada, Sweden, the UK and the Vatican. In 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland they contributed less strongly 
to the debate. Ethicists played only a minor role in the OECD and none in EU 
advisory bodies. In general, systematic investigation into ethical arguments was 
therefore less frequent, despite the fact that documents repeatedly emphasised 
its significance given the characteristics of the issue of xenotransplantation. 
Early documents on the ethics of xenotransplantation prepared by the Nuffield 
Council of Bioethics (1996) and the British Advisory Group on the Ethics 
of Xenotransplantation (1997) therefore often became important points of 
reference to various regulatory bodies on a national and international level, 
which were used to legitimate xenotransplantation research.
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The case studies revealed that difficulties in the integration of findings from 
assessment studies in policy-making is not a problem restricted to PTA. Expert 
TA also had some difficulties to directly impact the regulation process. While 
in three of our cases, the TA exercises had a strong impact on policy-making, 
in another two, direct impact was weaker, or ‘mixed’ at best. However, in three 
cases there was no direct impact on policy-making at all. Important factors that 
co-determined a study’s impact were: a) the institutional locus of the advisory 
body, b) its mandate as advisory or regulatory body, c) the extent to which its 
connection to policy making was institutionalised, and d) its reputation as a 
competent and independent organisation. Moreover, the technical development 
of the policy issue and the issue’s framing in political and broader public debate 
played a role.
Citizen participation in technically and ethically sensitive 
policy issues
To sum up, the CIT-PART project showed that in spite of a strong call for citizen 
engagement (in circles of experts and professionals, rather than among the 
public), the extent to which citizens were actually engaged in processes of 
debating and regulating xenotransplantation was very limited. Initiatives to 
that end were strongly contingent on context-specific national and historical 
developments, and were influenced by the way the issue of xenotransplantation 
was initially framed in expert reports prepared by international organisations 
and ‘first mover’ countries, as primarily a technical problem.
More generally, as regards the question whether PTA would inevitably lead to 
a restrictive policy, our analysis showed that two of the three political systems 
that made use of participatory instruments featured restrictive regulations 
on the risky new technology xenotransplantation. Equally, not all countries 
and international organisations that favoured expert advice ended up with 
permissive regulations. The CIT-PART project thus gives evidence of the 
perhaps counterintuitive observation that the involvement of the public does 
not necessarily lead to a ‘Not-In-My-Backyard’ sentiment resulting in a non-
introduction of the (new) technologies discussed, nor that a concentration on 
of these exercises. In the Netherlands, the results of the PTA were available only 
after xenotransplantation policies were adopted and the organizers of the PTA 
did not have concrete plans for feeding them into policy-making. As it turned 
out, PTA results and official xenotransplantation policies were congruent. The 
same was true for Switzerland. Again there was an agreement between PTA 
results and government policies, which were decided before the end of the 
participatory exercise. In the Canadian case, it was hard to pinpoint a direct 
impact of the consultation exercise because the government did not make an 
official statement on its xenotransplantation policies, and, in accordance with the 
public consultations’ opinion, thereafter no clinical trials were carried out.
However, adopting a broader framework for analysing impact as developed in 
the CIT-PART project, the PTAs can all be argued to have had an impact on the 
development of xenotransplantation regulation. The PTAs contributed to creating 
a public to the issue, to a (re)configuration of the relationship between relevant 
actor groups, to the definition of xenotransplantation as an issue and to a (de)
certification of claims made, and of actor positions in the debate and regulatory 
procedures. In all three cases, PTA exercises were considered legitimate and 
meaningful ways to gain knowledge and to involve the public in a debate about 
science and technology policy.
PTA exercises also turned out to be helpful in including opposing views on an 
issue (e.g. animal-rights). This was effective in Canada and Switzerland but only 
partly successful in the Netherlands, where a small group of animal welfare 
activists fundamentally opposed to xenotransplantation literally remained 
on the margin of public consultation events. However, experiences with TA on 
xenotransplantation at European level and in the UK showed that the exclusion 
of antagonistic NGOs can have negative consequences. Necessary conditions 
for including opposing interest groups are: a real willingness on the side of 
democratic institutions to include representatives of dissenting interest groups 
and to accommodate their views up to a point, instead of shutting them out; 
and a willingness on the side of interest groups to reach a compromise. Yet, we 
recognize that some groups may prefer to use the public arena outside of an 
institutional forum – through media or street protests – to make their case.
conclusions conclusions
123 122 
 Also traditions of neo-corporatism in which strong interest groups dominate 
policy-making and exclude direct citizen involvement (Sweden, Austria) can 
hinder PTA. 
 This is also true for the strong and exclusive link between elites from science 
and civil service observed, e. g, in the OECD. Adopting such deficit models, as 
was the case to various degrees in our cases (Austria, Latvia, Sweden, Vatican, 
and even in the staging of a full PTA in the Netherlands), implies denying the 
public a legitimate voice. Yet, what CIT-PART also shows is that a PTA often 
presents a first occasion for people to encounter an issue, and as such is 
instrumental in creating a public for the issue in the first place. Awareness of 
that role, in addition to an acknowledgement that this does not necessarily 
imply the attitudes associated with the deficit model may help set the stage for 
proper public engagement.
• As already mentioned, framing turned out to be a critical issue in citizen 
participation. Who is allowed to determine what framing counts as legitimate 
in a (P)TA setting? In several cases TA only allowed for downstream-oriented 
and strictly scientific framing with an emphasis on “sound science” and risk 
evaluation. It sometimes explicitly excluded a broader framing by social, ethical, 
economic and political questions. Scientific commissions who subscribed to 
a strict scientific paradigm sometimes delegated these questions to ethics 
commission, which in fact rarely convened. Often it was solely experts and 
policy-makers who framed the topic and controlled access to TA, while the 
public was left out or, as was sometimes the case in Sweden, was considered 
represented by experts and elected politicians. The PTA examples of Canada, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland showed that broader and up-stream framing was 
possible, overcoming a narrow scientific framing and downstream orientation.
• In addition, in some countries such as Austria, Latvia and Italy the lack of 
organizational structures and funding for PTA badly impeded the potentiality 
of citizen engagement.
expert advice in decision-making makes acceptance of a new policy more likely.
As concerns some questions of gender, our study showed that women were more 
equally represented in advisory bodies and as participants in citizen forums 
and public discussion than in expert TA. There was more awareness towards the 
composition of such bodies in PTA than in TA arrangements. PTA therefore has the 
potential to further the cause of women in discussion, consultation and decision-
making in science and technology policy.
Our research also showed a number of factors which can restrict citizen 
participation.
• The case of Latvia showed that a topic has to be perceived as political to be 
meaningfully addressed by participatory practices. Citizen participation simply 
does not make sense as long as xenotransplantation is exclusively perceived 
as a matter of individual choice about a medical treatment made by a single 
patient and his/her physician, rather than a political issue concerning society 
at large. Understood as a matter of individual choice, questions of collective 
risks, ethics and human rights are bracketed out of the discussion. This 
observation has far-reaching implications. It draws attention to the need to 
frame an issue as a matter of political judgement rather than (or in addition 
to) individual (medical) choice in early (international) reports that mark the 
beginning of processes of policy-making regulation. The xenotransplantation 
case studied in the CIT-PART project shows that the predominantly technical 
framings of the authoritative reports of the OECD and the WHO, among others, 
impacted the way the issue was picked up and understood on the national 
level. Furthermore, on the national level, decisions on individual clinical trials 
made by expert commissions on a case-by-case basis also undermined an 
understanding of xenotransplantation as a fundamentally political issue. 
 As the case of Latvia and Austria showed in order to give the notion of ‘citizen 
participation’ any meaning, the public has to see itself as a legitimate actor 
vis-à-vis policy makers and experts in discussing some issue. A lax attitude 
among the public is reinforced by policy makers’ and experts’ attitude of what 
one may call the paternalism of adopting a ‘deficit model’ in organizing public 
debate (Felt/Wynne 2007). 
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in a ministry (Einsiedel et al. 2011). Together with Switzerland (Griessler 2011), 
Canada is a good example of how to adapt the Danish consensus conference 
model successfully (Klüver 2002) in another country.
• Transparency and accountability are important challenges for TA and PTA. In 
this respect we can learn both from cases of TA and PTA. In Switzerland the 
organisation actually carrying out PTA was selected after an international open 
call for tender. This contrasts with some examples where recruitment was based 
on opaque political nomination or self-selection by personal acquaintances 
and on unclear selection criteria. The advisory system at EC level that dealt with 
xenotransplantation is another example of good practice in this case. In the 
aftermath of the BSE scandal it developed routines of recruitment and committee 
work that contribute to accountability (Griessler et al. 2012a). This includes the 
recruitment of members after an open call for expressions of interests and the 
publication of selection criteria. Moreover there are established working routines 
such as regularly demanding declarations of conflicts of interest, publication 
of agendas, meetings, reports, and public consultation. Though there is always 
room for further improvement, these routines established in EC scientific 
advisory bodies might serve as examples to increase accountability (Griessler et 
al. 2012a). Openness is another important element in PTA. The British UKXIRA’s 
approach of holding its annual meeting in public (Brown/Beynon-Jones 2011) 
might provide an example for the increasing accountability of advisory bodies.
• As can be seen from our study, the creation of impact on the regulatory process is 
a particular challenge to TA and PTA. The Swiss TA and PTA on xenotransplantation 
provide good examples how to make an effort to embed such exercises in the 
wider social and political context in order to increase direct impact on policy-
making. TA-Swiss involved the Ministry as co-organizer and member of the 
advisory boards that accompanied the studies. It presented the results both to 
Parliament, the Ministry and to the general public at a press conference.
• Involving antagonistic groups in PTA and TA is also a particular challenge. 
Again TA-Swiss provided an example how to involve groups critical of 
xenotransplantation fruitfully into TA and PTA by including them in advisory 
boards and involving them as experts and informant NGOs (Griessler 2011).
The cases studied in the CIT-PART project revealed a number of elements in 
existing TA and PTA exercises which might facilitate public involvement.
• In several cases countries could build on existing traditions and practices of 
citizen involvement in policy-making. This includes the Canadian tradition 
of including individuals and groups in Royal Commissions; Denmark, though 
it did not use PTA in xenotransplantation, in many other cases has a strong 
tradition of adult education; in the Netherlands a tradition of policy negotiation 
exists (the so-called Polder Model), which puts consultation at the heart of 
policy preparation and formulation. This idea is also present in the country’s 
approach to PTA, where the tradition of stakeholder consultation is broadened 
to include the wider public; Switzerland, finally, has a strong tradition of direct 
democracy. It was obvious in our cases that countries lacking such traditions 
of citizen participation did not consider PTA or attach meaning to the notion of 
citizen engagement.
• In order to get to a broad framing of the issue and to involve citizens in as many 
ways possible, it is necessary to apply a multiplicity of methods. The Canadian 
PTA is a good example in this case. In a representative and an open model, a 
number of different methods were applied to encourage public consultation 
and public participation.
• Xenotransplantation is a multidisciplinary research field, which involves 
scientific areas such as surgery, physiology, immunology, genetics, infectious 
diseases, and veterinary medicine and therefore it also crosscuts policy 
fields and departmental responsibilities. This poses a particular challenge 
to TA and PTA. Canada provides a good example of how to deal with this 
challenge. Recognizing that xenotransplantation was a crosscutting and inter-
departmental issue which concerned human health, animal issues and ethics, 
Health Canada took particular care to create interdepartmental coordination 
and to embed a new instrument for public consultation in its organisation. PTA 
was meticulously planned and later evaluated. The overall positive evaluations 
of PTA and its prior embedding in the organisation enabled long-term 
institutional learning which established public consultation as a routine tool 
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3. CIT-PART shows that a PTA often presents a first exposure of people to a 
particular issue. The instrumental role of PTA in creating a public in relation 
to the issue should not be confused with, or understood per se in terms of 
the deficit model. The deficit model implies denying the public a legitimate 
voice. A perspective on reaching out to an audience to create a public implies 
setting the stage for genuine civic engagement in political judgement. The 
theatre play included in the Dutch PTA setting, based on a British play, which 
toured schools and other young people’s meeting places, presents a good 
example of how to establish such an involvement practically. However, the 
case of Denmark revealed that in some cases it might not be useful to plead 
for a PTA, because, depending on a country’s history, culture and specific 
setting, the topic is considered benign, uncontroversial or untimely, or only 
relevant in too distant a future.
4. Allow for a broad framing that not only considers “sound science” but 
also allows for social, political, economic and ethical questions raised by 
stakeholders and the public.
5. Try to embed PTA as much as possible in an organisation to increase its impact 
and instigate institutional learning. Most topics in science and technology 
policy present issues that cut across institutional borders. Take into account 
departmental specialisation, which might be connected to departmental 
fragmentation and struggles. Work against organisational fragmentation 
by involving responsible authorities, agencies and departments in order to 
increase the impact of PTA later on. 
6. Build on existing participatory traditions and practices.
7. Take also into consideration factors that might hinder PTA such as closeness 
of policy-making, closely knit policy communities, paternalism, expert 
orientation, lack of accountability, transparency and openness, lack of open 
public debate and active mass media. Learn from and improve existing 
international examples that worked to overcome these obstacles. There are 
good examples not only in PTA but also in TA for critical elements such as 
transparency, openness, accountability, embedding, diversity of methods, 
involvement of antagonistic groups, overcoming the division between the 
different cultures of science, opening of framing, improving timing, and 
enhancing direct impact.
• The division between natural sciences on the one hand and social sciences, 
humanities and ethics on the other is a particular challenge to both TA and 
PTA. In our cases there were several examples of how successfully to address 
and partly overcome this division. In Sweden natural scientists and social 
scientists started to collaborate in research projects that also investigated 
the meaning of xenotransplantation for patients and the social dimension of 
xenotransplantation (Hansson/Lundin 2011). The methodology used in the 
Pontifical Academy for Life, in which scientists and ethicist discussed questions 
of science and ethics was highly appreciated by interviewees (Griessler et al. 
2012b). This example might need further investigation in order to remedy the 
obvious lack of ethical considerations in many of the TA studies.
Recommendations
1. PTA was carried out only in a minority of cases in regulating xenotransplan-
tation, and had little direct impact on it. Still, when assessed in terms of the 
process-oriented impact assessment framework developed in the CIT-PART 
project, PTA can be considered a success, given its numerous positive effects 
in creating and stimulating public debate. It is recommendable therefore 
that the use of PTA should be increased, particularly in expert international 
bodies and in the EU advisory system, which despite their high significance 
for international policy development tend to frame discussions of techno-
logies purely in terms of sound science.
2. International expert bodies are advised to increase awareness of how their 
work may impact the way an issue is framed in (national) policy-making 
processes. In addition to the many mechanisms that increase accountability, 
the encouragement to include citizens in processes of analysis, judgement 
and even decision-making should be more than just an appendix to the 
recommendations. Only if the idea of civic engagement is at the heart of 
a body’s framing of the issue may it further help public involvement on a 
countrywide level.
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8. Think about how to increase direct impact on policy-making but also on 
broader terms of impact in the public debate.
9. Timing turned out to be a problem in two cases of PTA, i.e. the result of PTA 
came shortly or long after a political decision was made. Only in Canada 
was it stated that no decision would be made until the PTA was finished. 
Several cases showed that regulators felt a certain urgency to arrive at 
policies, which were produced by the promises of xenotransplantation 
research that clinical trials would be imminent (Beynon-Jones/Brown 2011). 
However, predictions that clinical application was ‘just around the corner’, 
it turned out, were unrealistic. Participatory experiments need time. Policy-
makers therefore should consider not answering the pressure produced by 
promises from science and industry too promptly, and allow sufficient time 
to stimulate proper civic engagement in procedures for political judgement 
on issues such as xenotransplantation, which touch on the very basics of 
our understanding of public health, medical choice, collective safety and 
human identity.
10. For researchers of public engagement in science and technology policy, it is 
recommendable not to take formal arrangements for public debate as a point 
of departure in designing research. As the CIT-PART project shows, wider 
perspectives of how science and technology policy unfolds, for instance by 
taking a particular issue as a starting point in the analysis, shed light on 
subtle and complex conditions under which civic engagement is stimulated 
or hampered in today’s networked arenas for public policy-making.
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